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Article
Answering the Millennium Call for the Right
to Maternal Health: The Need to Eliminate
User Fees
Margaux J. Hall, Aziza Ahmed and Stephanie E.
Swanson t
Complications during childbirth and pregnancy are a main source
of death and disability among women of reproductive age.
Approximately 536,000 women die from pregnancy-related
complications each year. Developing countries suffer most
profoundly, accounting for 99% of deaths. The world's nations, by
endorsing U.N. Millennium Development Goals, recognized that
most deaths are preventable; they have pledged to reduce maternal
mortality by 75% by 2015. This Article assesses the barriers
presented by user fees - formal charges for health services still
charged by many countries - to the attainment of MDGs. It shows
that user fees hamper healthcare access, particularly in emergency-
care settings, and fail in meeting their intended purposes of
generating funds and improving equity, quality and
decentralization of health care. The Article analyzes fees' adverse
t This article emerged from a project done on behalf of Physicians for Human Rights
(PHR) through the International Human Rights Clinic, Human Rights Program (HRP),
Harvard Law School. Alicia Ely Yamin and Mindy Roseman supervised the project on behalf
of PHR and HRP, respectively. Margaux J. Hall received a J.D. cum laude from Harvard Law
School in 2008 and is currently studying as a Fulbright Scholar in South Africa and a Sheldon
Scholar in East Africa. Aziza Ahmed graduated from the UC Berkeley School of Law in 2007
and holds a Masters of Science in Population and International Health from the Harvard
School of Public Health. She is currently a Women's Law and Public Policy Fellow with the
International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS. Stephanie E. Swanson received
a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2008 and is currently an associate in the New York office of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. The authors wish to thank Alicia Yamin and Mindy
Roseman, as well as Eric Friedman from PHR, for their contributions, without which this
Article would not be possible.
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impact through a human rights lens that privileges each woman
with an assessment of her health, unlike the MDGs which assess
aggregate improvements and benchmarks. Finally, the Article
explores alternatives to user fees, including universal health
insurance schemes, tax schemes, and debt forgiveness programs
and policies. It offers a guiding framework for assessing health
financing systems - a framework that is centered on the needs of
the poorest and most marginalized community members and that
emphasizes accountability.
INTRODUCTION
Complications during childbirth and pregnancy are one of the main
sources of death and disability among women of reproductive age in
developing countries.' Approximately 536,000 women died from
pregnancy-related complications in 2005.2 For every woman who dies,
about twenty others suffer serious injury, infection, or disease.3 The
majority of maternal deaths are preventable, even in countries with limited
resources.4 Behind these startling statistics are the individual stories of
persons whose lives are dramatically altered as a result of maternal death
- the story, for example, of a young Nigerian woman who went into
premature labor as a result of preeclampsia and needed an emergency
caesarian section.5 Her husband learned that the procedure would cost
20,000 naira (about $160) and abandoned his wife, leaving her friends and
relatives to try to raise the money. 6 When the doctors refused to perform
the required surgery until her family raised 70% of the money, she died.7
In the background of the stories are other deeply affected persons -
1. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2005: ESTIMATES
DEVELOPED BY WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, AND THE WORLD BANK (2007) [hereinafter MATERNAL
MORTALITY ESTIMATES 2005]. For example, the adult lifetime risk of maternal death - the
probability that a 15-year-old woman will die from a maternal cause - is one in twenty-six in
Africa and one in seven in Niger. Id. at 1.
2. Id. at 16.
3. See UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, PROGRESS
TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 1990-2005, GOAL 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL
HEALTH (2005), http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/ Resources/ Attach/ Products/
Progress2005/goal_5.doc [hereinafter UNDP GOAL 5 REPORT].
4. See WHO, BEYOND THE NUMBERS: REVIEWING MATERNAL DEATHS AND COMPLICATIONS
TO MAKE PREGNANCY SAFER (2004). Maternal death is defined as "Itihe death of a woman
while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration
and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its
management but not from accidental or incidental causes." MATERNAL MORTALITY ESTIMATES
2005, supra note 1, at 4.
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children who suffer from the disappearance of a key caretaker, and
spouses, partners, and extended family members who must stretch their
resources and assume responsibility for child-rearing and other roles
formerly filled by the mother. Maternal deaths do not affect just one
person; they impact whole families and communities.
The problem of maternal deaths is experienced most profoundly in
developing countries, which account for 99% of the total annual maternal
deaths, 533,000 worldwide in 2005.8 Africa and South Asia together
combined to make up 86% of total worldwide maternal deaths in 2005.9
Significant differences also exist within nations, with poor and rural areas
frequently experiencing more maternal deaths than their wealthier and
urban counterparts.10
The world's nations, by endorsing the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and other international development
consensus documents, have recognized that most of women's deaths and
injuries due to pregnancy-related health complications are preventable.
They have pledged to take urgent action to ensure that maternal mortality
is reduced by 75% by 2015 -" To meet this goal, all women must have
access to high-quality health care services during child delivery. 12 The
MDGs list three essential elements of these services: a skilled attendant at
delivery, access to emergency obstetric care in the event of a complication,
and a referral system to ensure that women experiencing complications can
reach life-saving care in adequate time.13
In its latest report, the World Health Organization noted that the
world's nations are not close to attaining this goal.1 4 The global maternal
mortality rate has declined only 1% each year between 1990 and 2005, far
from the 5.5% needed to reach the target goal.15 Conditions are worse in
sub-Saharan Africa, where the annual decline has been about 0.1%.16
This Article assesses the barriers imposed by formal fees for health care
services, more commonly known as user fees. The introduction of user fees
in the 1980s arose following the publication of a significant body of
literature detailing their efficacy. The World Bank was particularly
instrumental in creating the original theoretical consensus for user fees as a
viable health financing mechanism.17 In 1985, the World Bank hailed user
8. MATERNAL MORTALITY ESTIMATES 2005, supra note 1, at 15.
9. Id.
10. For example, in Ethiopia, the rich are twenty-eight times as likely as the poor to have a
medically trained health care provider attend childcare deliveries. In Chad and Niger, the
difference is at least fourteen-fold between rich and poor regions. See UNDP GOAL 5 REPORT,
supra note 3, at 3.
11. See UNDP GOAL 5 REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id.
14. MATERNAL MORTALITY ESTIMATES 2005, supra note 1, at 18.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., JOHN AKIN ET AL., WORLD BANK, FINANCING HEALTH SERVICES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 25-48 (1987); DAVID DE FERRANTI, PAYING FOR HEALTH
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fees as "opportunities for greater cost recovery from users," and one of the
four primary ways to improve health care financing in developing
countries.18 Since that time, many studies have more thoroughly examined
user fees' progress in meeting their intended goals. 19 Some studies have
emphasized the changes needed to make user fees more successful,
including the implementation of better exemption policies.20 Others have
highlighted evidence demonstrating that user fees have not improved
health service delivery in developing countries. 21 Selected studies have
focused on the gender inequities inherent in health care systems,
specifically pointing out the inequity of cost burdens for women.22
Increasingly, studies frame maternal health as a human right.23
This Article draws on scholarship from the health policy and human
rights fields to show that user fees dangerously impede access to urgently
needed maternal health care. Such fees create significant roadblocks to the
fulfillment of the MDGs in many regions of the world, dramatically
altering the trajectory of maternal deaths by hampering access to health
care, particularly in emergency care settings. User fees have failed to meet
their stated purpose of generating funds for health programs, the rationale
for their implementation. Instead, user fees prevent vulnerable individuals
from seeking out and receiving necessary health care.
The global community must eliminate user fees for maternal health
services to meet the goal of dramatically reducing maternal mortality by
2015. If it fails to do, the world's nations will not only fall short of attaining
the global goal, they will also fail to protect the human rights of a large
18. DE FERRANTI, supra note 17, at 5.
19. See GuY HUTTON, DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HEALTH SYSTEMS
RESOURCE CENTRE, CHARTING THE PATH TO THE WORLD BANK'S "No BLANKET POLICY ON USER
FEES," (2004), available at http://www.dfidhealthrc.org/publications/health-sector-financing
/04Hut0l.pdf.
20. See L. Gilson, The Lessons of User Fees in Africa, 12 HEALTH POL'Y PLAN. 273 (1997).
21. See HUTrON, supra note 19, § 2.3 (noting, in particular, that "both theoretical and
empirical studies were negative towards SAPs [structural adjustment programs] and its
effects on health outcomes, mainly through user fees, reduced access to care and deteriorating
quality of care") (emphasis added). See also John Walley et al., Primary Health Care: Making
Alma-Ata a Reality, 372 LANCET 1001 (2008) (proposing the elimination of user fees and
introducing a continuum of care for maternal health services, including community-based
care); Chris James et al., To Retain or Remove User Fees?: Reflections on the Current Debate in Low-
and Middle-Income Countries, 5 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL'Y 137 (2006) (offering a
more nuanced view of the methods for eliminating user fees).
22. See, e.g., Hilary Standing, Gender and Equity in Health Sector Reform Programmes: A
Review, 12 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 1, 3 (1997); Priya Nanda, Gender Dimensions of User Fees:
Implications for Women's Utilization of Health Care, 10 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 127,128 (2002).
23. See generally L. P. Freedman, Using Human Rights in Maternal Mortality Programs: From
Analysis to Strategy, 75 INT'L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 51 (2001) (describing a human-
rights based approach to reducing maternal mortality that not only denounces maternal
death, but also offers ways to integrate human rights into the design and implementation of
maternal mortality policies and programs); Paul Hunt et al., United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA), Reducing Maternal Mortality: The Contribution of the Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health (2007), available at http://www.unfpa.org/publications/detail.cfm?D=356
(describing a human rights framework for maternal mortality reduction programs and
suggesting potential advocacy and accountability tools).
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subset of their citizens.
This Article analyzes user fees' adverse impact on maternal mortality
rates through the lens of human rights. It first provides an analysis of user
fees, including how they are defined and how they interact with the other
costs women confront when accessing key maternal health services. The
Article then discusses the history of user fees, from the widespread
implementation of user fees by developing countries under pressure from
multilateral lenders and aid organizations to the more recent rethinking of
user fees in light of their well-recognized harms. Despite the revision of
user fee policies, they remain prevalent in developing countries due, in
part, to conditional loans from organizations like the World Bank that
advocate free-market principles in the provision of social services.
Next, the Article looks at user fees and maternal health. It documents
how user fees have detrimentally impacted women across the globe and
contributed to high rates of maternal mortality. In light of user fees'
harmful impact on women, the Article then examines whether these fees
have achieved any of the economic and systemic goals that accompanied
their introduction. It shows that user fees have fallen short of their stated
goals: exemptions meant to act as a safeguard for the poorest community
members have failed to reach their intended recipients; user fees have
failed to generate significant revenue for the health sector or increase
efficiency; they have made no significant improvements in the quality of
care or promoted equity in the provision of health care; and user fees have
not decentralized health care provision to increase accountability and
community participation.
The Article then applies human rights as a framework to evaluate user
fees' impact on maternal health. The framework emphasizes the principle
of non-discrimination: all citizens are entitled to human rights, including
poor, geographically disadvantaged, and ethnic minority women of child-
bearing age. By focusing a lens on these women, one can gauge the global
community's success in realizing human rights for all citizens. Notably,
the millennium goal regarding maternal health assesses aggregate
improvements in women's health status. A human rights framework, in
contrast, delves deeper by providing each woman with her own
assessment of her health status. 24 The Article shows that from a human
rights perspective, user fees have failed to secure the rights to non-
discrimination, health and life. In order to provide disadvantaged women
with the right to health, states must eliminate barriers to service and ensure
affordable maternal health services.
Finally, the Article explores several alternatives to user fees, such as,
for example, the taxation and insurance provisions employed by Ghana.25
24. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), art. 12,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 ("Certain human rights provide an express foundation for the
attainment of maternal health. The most salient of the rights is the right to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.").
25. WOTRO, Integrated Programmes - Reaching the Poor in Ghana's National
Health Insurance Scheme, available at
http://www.nwo.nl/nwohome.nsf/pages/NWOA-74Y9R3- 5
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It evaluates these alternatives against the backdrop of the great debt
burdens confronting many developing countries. The Article offers lessons
for international lending institutions and wealthy states that will benefit
the poor and ensure accountability. The Article concludes by offering a
series of recommendations regarding eliminating user fees and instituting
more gender sensitive health care financing schemes. These
recommendations draw on human rights principles and offer a feasible
path to attaining the millennium consensus goals regarding maternal
health.
I. USER FEES: ANALYSIS
Costs associated with maternal health fall into two broad categories:
formal fees and informal costs.
A. Formal Fees
Formal fees, those most commonly discussed in the literature, tend to
be explicit charges at the point of service for medical treatment provided. 26
The fees can be retained at the point of service or aggregated at the national
level, and may be used to support capital or recurring costs. 27 Formal fees
may include consultation fees, rental fees for a hospital bed, registration
fees, and fees for medicine, blood or laboratory tests.28 Insurance and other
risk-sharing financing schemes tend to address these fees.29
Eng.
26. See WHO, THE IMPACT OF USER FEES ON HEALTH SERVICE UTILIZATION IN LOW- AND
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: How STRONG IS THE EVIDENCE? 839 (2008). The WHO's definition
of "user fees" is as follows:
User fees refer to a financing mechanism that has two main
characteristics: payment is made at the point of service use and there is no
risk sharing. User fees can entail any combination of drug costs, supply
and medical material costs, entrance fees or consultation fees. They are
typically paid for each visit to a health service provider, although in some
cases follow-up visits for the same episode of illness can be covered by
the initial payment.
Id.
27. COALITION FOR HEALTH AND EDUCATION RIGHTS (CHER), USER FEES: THE RIGHT TO
EDUCATION AND HEALTH DENIED, A POLICY BRIEF FOR THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON CHILDREN
5 (2002), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc-lib/147-1-user-fees.pdf.
28. Id.
29. WHO, supra note 26, at 839.
2009]
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B. Informal Costs
There often are a large number of related costs that households must
bear in order to access services related to maternal health, such as
transportation costs to reach the hospital.30 In order to travel to receive
care, many women must bring family members with them and pay the
associated costs for their travel, food, and lodging.31 Women also face the
opportunity cost of lost work during the time they are away seeking
medical care.32 The sum of these costs can be substantial and presents
significant barriers to accessing service. 33 This is especially true for women
living in remote, rural areas with only intermittently accessible medical
service.34
In this Article, we use the term user fees to represent the state-imposed
formal fees that are borne by women and their families seeking to obtain
maternal health care. We highlight the need for financing mechanisms to
minimize formal fees to increase access to maternal health services and
decrease maternal mortality. However, the Article also recognizes that
governments must address the financial burdens imposed by informal
costs such as transportation, food and lodging as part of a comprehensive,
long-term solution to maternal health.
II. USER FEES: HISTORY
User fees were first proposed to fill revenue gaps in under-funded
public health care services. 35 The fees were implemented in the 1980s as
part of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) advocated by international
lending institutions such as the World Bank. 36 These SAPs countered
previous high levels of public spending on health services.37
Following their independence from colonial rule, many developing
countries, especially those in Africa, adopted progressive policies to
provide for free health care services. 38 However, in the ensuing decades
30. WORLD BANK, WAIVERS AND EXEMPTIONS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, SOCIAL SAFETY NET PRIMER NOTES 2 (2003 Vol. 9).
31. Id. See also Pablo Enrique Gottret & George Schieber, Health Financing Revisited: A
Practitioner's Guide, WORLD BANK 232 (2006) (arguing that there are direct and indirect
payments associated with accessing health care services).
32. WORLD BANK, supra note 30, at 2.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Monique Hennink & Nyovani Madise, Appropriateness of User Fees for
Reproductive Health in Malawi, Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute
Applications and Policy Working Paper (2004) (concluding that those persons in Malawi most
likely to be affected by user fees for contraceptives are rural residents).
35. HuTroN, supra note 19, § 2.3.
36. Id. § 2.4.
37. SOPHIE WITTER, SAVE THE CHILDREN, AN UNNECESSARY EVIL: USER FEES FOR
HEALTHCARE IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 5 (2005).
38. Id. See also RUDOLPH KNIPPENBERG ET AL., WORLD BANK, INCREASING CLIENTS' POWER
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many of these countries plunged into debt and economic decline. 39 By the
1970s and 1980s, many states suffered from insufficient economic resources
to invest in health care systems.40 At the same time, confidence in the
ability of the public sector to provide effectively for comprehensive health
services diminished. 41 Several countries experienced deteriorated working
conditions, an inability to pay the salaries of health personnel, and an
overall reduced effectiveness of medical systems. 42
Thus, the 1980s featured a significant "paradigm shift" with respect to
health care provision.43 International institutions including the World
Bank, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization began encouraging
developing countries to decrease public spending on social services and
increase collection of private party payments for services.44 User fees were
a critical part of a broader neoliberal development trend (now coined the
"Washington Consensus") which pushed a standard reform package for
development, advocated to developing countries by the IMF, World Bank,
and U.S. Treasury Department.45 The Washington Consensus development
policy encouraged structural adjustment to a market-oriented economy
through, among other actions, the liberalization of trade, decreased public
spending, currency devaluation, and increased privatization. With respect
to the health sector, the new development policy emphasized reduced
public spending on health services, with upfront private payments for
health care.46
A. The Bamako Initiative's Push for User Fees
In 1987, African health ministers met in Bamako, Mali to discuss the
successes and challenges of the cost recovery approaches that had been
recently implemented. Their discussions led to the formation of the
Bamako Initiative (BI), which aimed to provide universal accessibility to
primary health care through decentralizing services and providing for the
self-sustaining payment of health care system recurrent costs.47
The BI sought to involve communities in providing health care by
challenging these communities to:
* Decentralize management and decision-making in the health
sector to transfer control from the national to the local level;






45. See Videotape: John Williamson The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for
Development (World Bank 2004) (on file with World Bank), available at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/bspan/PresentationView.asp?PID=1003&EID=328.
46. Id.
47. KNIPPENBERG ET AL., supra note 38, at 4-5.
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* Create community-based cost-sharing and co-management
responsibilities so that local health staff are accountable for
access and quality of care; and,
* Minimize the effects of variations in funding from government
and donors by generating local revenue to guarantee the
availability of medicines. 48
The BI ultimately led to the implementation of user fees in a variety of
forms across many African countries. Cost-recovery via user fees took
place through charges at the point of use for such items as medical
consultations, medicines, and inpatient stays. 49 Many view the BI as a
strategic initiative that encouraged countries to adopt user fees when their
loan agreements did not expressly provide for fee implementation
procedures.50
International institutions such as the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) initially promoted
the BI.51
An original goal of the BI was to implement user fees in order to
increase health sector revenue and the quality and coverage of health
services.5 2 One of the BI's salient characteristics was the implementation of
user fees on a local rather than national level.5 3 Indeed, a central principle
of the BI was the local retention and management of collected revenue.5 4
This decentralized system was intended to produce higher quality service
and accountability in the health sector, increase drug availability, and
ensure better implementation of exemptions for the poor. 55 To this end,
user fees were levied at the point of service delivery; they were borne
exclusively by the health care consumer. 56
The BI recognized that fees could pose a barrier to health care access
for low-income households.5 7 As such, fees were meant to be levied at a
cost proportionate to household income, meaning that the poorest patients
would receive free care. User fee advocates thought that community
health schemes and the government would be able to subsidize low-
income patients. 58 A subsidy scale existed for different types of materials
and treatments, and the poorest members of the community could be
entirely subsidized or exempted from payments.5 9 Yet, from the early days
48. Id.
49. HUrrON, supra note 19, § 2.7.
50. Id. § 2.5.
51. Id. § 2.4.
52. WmTrER, supra note 37, at 5-6.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id.
55. See HUTrON, supra note 19, § 2.6.
56. Alaka Singh, Building on the User-Fee Experience: The African Case 2 (WHO, Discussion
Paper No. 3, 2003).
57. ELDIS, Background: The Bamako Initiative, http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-
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of user fees, equity was only a minor goal of the BI. 60
B. User Fees Prescribed By Multilateral Loans and Aid
The World Bank, the IMF and the Treasury Department began
encouraging developing countries to implement user fees by conditioning
their international loans upon the BI cost-recovery principles.61
1. Origins of the World Bank Policy on User Fees 62
The World Bank originally introduced user fees as a solution for health
sector problems in developing countries in its 1987 "Agenda for Reform." 63
Fees were intended to increase health sector resources, thereby improving
the quality and efficiency of existing health programs, allowing more
spending on under-funded programs, and expanding the access of the poor
to health programs.64 The World Bank advanced the theory that the
implementation of user fees would:
* Improve efficiency and equity by increasing revenues to the
health care system;
* Increase quality and coverage of medical care by reducing
frivolous demand; and
* Shift patterns of care away from costly in-patient services to
low-cost primary health care services, while protecting the
poor through exemptions.6S5
Notably, the World Bank and other lending institutions envisioned that
the very poor members of developing countries would be exempted from
60. Id.
61. HUTrON, supra note 19, § 2.5.
62. The IMF's policy on user fees is also important to consider, although it is much less
transparent than World Bank policy. The IMF advises 184 member countries on policies that
promote economic stability, reduce vulnerability to crises, and promote higher living
standards. It also makes temporary financing available to member countries to help them
address macro-level economic challenges. International Monetary Fund, What is the IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). The IMF
focuses on macroeconomic and financial sector concerns, while the World Bank looks at
specific social sector policies; nevertheless these macro-policies can strongly influence social
sector developments. It should also be noted that while there is no specific user fee policy
promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Bank does state that countries
applying for IDB loans should keep in mind that "[w]herever possible a fee for services
rendered principle should be applied . . . . In those instances ... in which services are
rendered to income groups capable of payment, 'user' fees should be established." Inter-
American Development Bank, Sectoral Operational Policies, Public Health,
http://www.iadb.org/exr/pic/VII/OP_742.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
63. JOHN S. AKIN ET AL., WORLD BANK, FINANCING HEALTH SERVICES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIEs: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 3-5 (1987).
64. Id.
65. See WITrER, supra note 37, at 5-6. 10
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certain fees.66
User fees soon became an integral component of the World Bank's
structural adjustment programs as a means of cost recovery. 67 Over time,
user fees became a condition placed on international finance institutions'
(IFIs) loans, namely those of the IMF and World Bank.68 SAPs aimed to
decrease the role of the state in the provision of goods and services, with
the provision of health care shifting from the public to the private sector.
This trend continues today, with public sector funding of health
currently accounting for a small share, less than 30%, of the amount spent
on health care in low-income countries. 69 These low levels of public
funding of health care are reinforced by the overall strategy of SAPs and
neo-liberal development policies.70 The low public sector funding is
particularly significant in light of the global health spending deficit in
developing countries. Although developing countries account for 84% of
global population and 90% of the global disease burden, they account for
only 12% of global health spending.71 Furthermore, the poorest countries
bear 56% of the global disease burden, yet account for only 2% of all health
spending.72
2. Progressive Implementation of User Fees in Developing Countries
SAPs became increasingly pervasive during the 1980s and early 1990s
in the majority of developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.73 A 1993 survey conducted by the World Bank of thirty-seven
African countries revealed that thirty-three had cost-recovery policies at
the national or local level. Most of these cost-recovery policies had been
implemented since 1980.74
From early on, exemptions to the user fees advocated by the World
Bank were not implemented in a uniform manner. A study of twenty-five
African countries in the mid-1990s found that only fifteen countries had
user fee exemptions for the poor, and only one country, Zimbabwe, had
66. HUTTrON, supra note 19, § 2.4 (discussing de Ferranti's 1985 proposed financing
scheme).
67. WiTrER, supra note 37, at 5.
68. CHER, supra note 27, at 3.
69. Public spending on health care constitutes only 29% of total health care spending in
low-income countries. George Schieber, World Bank, Health Financing in Developing Countries,
HEALTH SYs. NEWSL. 2 (2006), http://sitesources.worldbank.org/ INTAFRHEANUTPOP/
Resources/HSDNewsJune_2006.pdf (lat visited April 15, 2009).
70. See Kasturi Sen & Meri Kolvusalo, Health Care Reforms and Developing Countries: A
Critical Overview, 13 INT'LJ. OF HEALTH PLAN. & MGMT. 199, 202 (1998). Structural adjustment
programs have also been categorized as simply a form of neo-colonialism. See also Michael
Reich, Reshaping the State From Above, From Within, From Below: Implications for Public Health, 54
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1669 (2002) (describing how international agencies' policies, such as SAP and
neoliberal policies, imposed "from above'"affect public health delivery on the ground).
71. Schieber, supra note 69, 1.
72. Id.
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clearly delineated income limits that qualified for the exemption. 75
3. Evolution of the World Bank Policy on User Fees: "No Blanket Rule"
User fees came under attack in the mid-1990s from civil society,
particularly non-governmental and human rights organizations, as seen in
the Addis Ababa Consensus on Principles on Cost Sharing.76 The World
Bank's 1993 Development Report also mentions the growing controversy. 77
Nevertheless, the Bank maintained that, since even patients at supposedly
"free" government clinics faced hidden costs, user fees could increase poor
persons' utilization of health services if they met other intended goals and
reduced indirect costs, such as transportation costs.78 The Bank did,
however, state user fees were not meeting the goal of providing
widespread health sector financing and were likely to be more useful
improving technical efficiency and drug supply.79
By 2000, the World Bank announced that it was retreating from its
prior policy of instituting user fees for basic social services. According to
one source, while user fees were not uniformly withdrawn from loan
conditions, IFIs, which serve as the key architects of health care financing
reforms in Africa, began to recognize that commercializing access to health
care was contributing to underdevelopment. 80
In its 2004 World Development Report, "Making Services Work for
Poor People," the World Bank sets forth its current "no blanket policy on
user fees":
There are times when user fees are appropriate - and some when
they are not. Based on the primary goal of making services work
for poor people, this Report argues against any blanket policy on
user fees that encompasses all services in all country
circumstances.81
The Bank uses the following methodology to determine whether to
apply user fees:8 2
75. Id. at 7.
76. HUrrON, supra note 19, § 3.3.3.
77. DEAN T. JAMISON ET AL., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING
IN HEALTH 118 (1993) ("User charges for public health services in developing countries have
sparked much debate since the World Bank endorsed the concept in 1987 in a policy study on
health financing. Critics argue that fees restrict access to care, especially for the poor.").
78. Id.
79. Id. at 11.
80. TAMARA BRAAM, THE IMPACT OF HEALTH SECTOR FINANCING REFORMS ON SEXUAL AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES IN AFRICA 5, 17 (Sonke Consulting 2005).
81. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: MAKING SERVICES WORK FOR POOR
PEOPLE 70 (2004).
82. Chart Originally published in WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004, supra note
81, at 71. Reprinted with permission from the World Bank. The World Bank holds all
copyrights to the data in this chart.
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Ifigure 15.
Because various points in the Bank's proposed analysis are susceptible
to wide interpretation, the practical implementation of the policy outline
on user fees remains fraught with ambiguity. Furthermore, the Bank still
strongly adheres to free market principles that create a more rigid
framework within which to change policy on social services like health
care. Underlying the Bank's approach is a belief that, in addition to
generating funding, user fees establish a market relationship between
provider and client and empower the client.83 The Bank's free-market
orientation with respect to health care transactions is evident:
The most direct way to get service providers to be accountable to
the client is to make whatever they get out of the transaction
depend on their meeting client needs and desires. That is, money
(usually) or other benefits from providing the service should
83. ld. at 66. 13
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follow the client - the enforceability of a relationship of
accountability.8 4
External donors like the World Bank often use the incentive of future
financial rewards, and the threat of imminent aid cessation, as leverage to
achieve specific policy changes.85 A review of the health programs in sub-
Saharan African countries in 2005 found that twenty-eight out of thirty-two
countries charged fees for essential healthcare services.8 6 In almost half of
the countries, user fees were an integral part of the World Bank project
design.87  In only two countries did projects actively support free
treatment, and these projects were both related to HIV/AIDS.88
User fees remain in effect in countries such as Tanzania, where the
World Bank helped the government incorporate user fees from 1994 to
1995 as part of an effort to improve the financial sustainability of the health
sector and increase access to health services. 89
The Bank does recognize that restricted access to care during
pregnancy contributes to the high maternal mortality rates in developing
countries, and that these high rates are exacerbated by poverty.90  It
recommends focusing on increasing maternal health care access for
disadvantaged and high risk groups, such as poor women and women in
underserved areas.91 In its April 2007 Health, Nutrition and Population
Strategy, the World Bank noted the importance of "[sletting the right
insurance and/or public financing mechanisms (including donor
financing) so that the cost of illness ... will not throw [a mother] and her
family into destitution, forced to sell the few assets they possess."92 Yet the
World Bank makes no explicit recommendation that user fees charged at
the point of service should be eliminated to achieve this result. None of its
recommendations for reducing maternal mortality include abolishing user
fees.93
84. Id.
85. See EURODAD, WORLD BANK AND IMF CONDITIONALITY: A DEVELOPMENT INJUSTICE
(2006), 3-5 (noting that "[oin average poor countries face as many as 67 conditions per World
Bank loan").
86. See Memorandum submitted by Save the Children UK on 'The World Bank Africa





89. LEONTIEN LATERVEER Er AL., EQUITY IMPLICATIONS OF HEALTH SECTOR USER FEES IN
TANZANIA: DO WE RETAIN THE USER FEE OR SET THE USER F(R)EE? RESEARCH ON POVERTY
ALLEVIATION 18 (2004), available at www.repoa.or.tz/documents-storage/Research-and_
Analysis/EquityImplicationsUserFeesHealth.pdf.
90. THE WORLD BANK, MATERNAL MORTALITY 1 (2006), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTPHAAG/ Resources/ AAGMatMort06.pdf.
91. Id. at 5.
92. THE WORLD BANK, HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT: THE WORLD BANK STRATEGY FOR HEALTH,
NUTRITION, AND POPULATION RESULTS 27 (2007) (emphasis omitted).
93. Id.
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4. U.N. Agencies
The U.N. family agencies offer a strong voice countering the World
Bank's policies on user fees. The WHO has acknowledged the extremely
regressive nature of user fees and advocates a move away from user fees. 94
A WHO report on reproductive health rights states, "It is uncertain and
problematic what effect the imposition of user fees would have on safe
motherhood among poor people in developing countries, particularly
whether such fees would deter or prevent poor women's resort to
necessary maternity care."95
U.N. policy also increasingly opposes user fees.96 UNICEF's user fee
policy states, "There are powerful economic and moral grounds on which
to avoid user financing for almost all basic social services." 97 One of the
significant "action messages" of the Safe Motherhood Inter-Agency Group
- a partnership made up of a broad constituency of partner countries,
U.N. and multilateral agencies, NGOs, health professional associations,
bilateral donors, and academic institutions - contains a commitment to
increasing access to quality maternal health services and ensuring that
social, cultural, and economic factors do not interfere with the attainment
of this goal.98
C. User Fees: Policies Among Bilateral Donors and NGOs
The World Bank and other IFIs are one major source of user fee
policies. However, bilateral donors and NGOs also play an important role.
An estimated 3% of donor budgets for aid are dedicated to the combination
of maternal and child health programs.99  This Article assesses the
following agencies, representing some of the larger bilateral donors and
NGOs, as examples of broader bilateral donor and NGO policies.
94. WHO, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2005 - MAKE EVERY MOTHER AND CHILD COUNT
137-39 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2OO5/en/.
95. REBECCA J. COOK ET AL., WHO, ADVANCING SAFE MOTHERHOOD THROUGH HUMAN
RIGHTS 46 (2001), available at http://www.who.int/reproductive-
health/publications/RHR 01_5 advancing-safemotherhoodthroughhumanrights.pdf.
96. U.N., Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meetings of the General
Assembly of September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General Assembly, 25, U.N. Doc.
A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/ga/59/hlpm-rev.
2.pdf.
97. SARAH ENGLAND Er AL., WHO, PRACTICE AND POLICIES ON USER FEES FOR
IMMUNIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 29 (2001), available at http://202.54.104.236/
intranet/eip/ immunizationmanager/pdf/UserFeesWHOstatement2001.pdf (citing SANJAY
REDDY & JAN VANDEMOORTELE, UNICEF, USER FINANCING OF BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES, A
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 1 (1996)).
98. WORLD BANK, SAFE MOTHERHOOD AND MATERNAL HEALTH,
http://go.worldbank.org/V5EPGZUL40.
99. Anthony Costello & David Osrin, The Case for a New Global Fund for Maternal, Neonatal,
and Child Survival, LANCET 1 (2005). (estimating a 3% expenditure based on USAID's
expenditure of 2.2% of its 2003 overall aid budget on child survival programs and DFID's
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1. USAID
USAID is the largest bilateral donor in the health sector.100 USAID has
no explicit policy on user fees. Rather, the agency works with individual
governments to implement health financing that is efficient, non-wasteful,
and equitable. 10  Some USAID-sponsored research has opposed the
implementation of user fees. For example, a 2005 USAID-sponsored
research study concluded, "Throughout the world, health care fees deter
the use of lifesaving skilled care at delivery. Poor families typically lack
funds to pay for high and often unpredictable maternity care fees."10 2
Other aspects of U.S. policy are more explicitly opposed to user fees.
In July 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a measure to put
pressure on the World Bank to eliminate user fees from its loan
conditions.10 3 NGOs persuaded Congress to create a specific U.S. policy
against user fees, and the World Bank retreated from its reliance on user
fees. 1°4 The 2000 U.S. foreign aid bill called for the IMF and World Bank to
eliminate the loan condition requiring a blanket policy on user fees. 105
Although the U.S. Treasury found loopholes in this law, they were
corrected in 2001. In particular, the original bill allowed a loophole for
"exemptions" under which user fees did not technically exist for poor
persons, despite the reality that exemptions do not function properly. 06
However, the 2000 language was later modified to forbid approval or
endorsement of user fees not only in loans, but also a wide range of World
Bank, IMF, and other regional bank agreements. Additional U.S. legal
provisions have called for further transparency on the part of IFIs. 10 7
2. British Department for International Development (DFID)
DFID is the department within the British government that manages
and coordinates the delivery of Britain's aid to developing countries. DFID
works as a bilateral donor to individual countries and also provides
development funding to multilateral agencies. 108 DFID has an explicit
100. See WHITE HOUSE, EXPECT MORE, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE CHILD SURVIVAL
AND HEALTH - POPULATION ASSESSMENT 2.4, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
expectmore/detail/10000404.2002.html.
101. See, e.g., Sidney Ruth Schuler et al., Paying for Reproductive Health Services in
Bangladesh: Intersections Between Cost, Quality, and Culture, 17 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 273, 273-
74 (2002) (describing USAID's role in supporting a consortium of NGOs in Bangladesh to
provide health services).
102. USAID, REPORT TO CONGRESS: HEALTH-RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVrTES AT USAID 26 (2005).
103. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-429 § 596, 114 Stat. 1900A-1, A-61 (2001).
104. HUTrON, supra note 19, Summary.
105. Foreign Operations Act, supra note 103.
106. RESULTS, RESULTS SUCCESSES IN 2001: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES,
http://www.results.org/website/article.asp?id=341.
107. HUTToN, supra note 19, § 3.3.3.
108. Department for International Development, About DFID: Who DFID Works With,
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policy against official user fees and actively seeks to remove them, at least
with respect to African nations. In October 2008, DFID stated that it has:
set out its commitment to help partner governments abolish user
fees for basic health services, as part of our wider effort to support
quality and equitable healthcare for all. We know that in many
countries user fees, and other charges, mean poor people cannot
afford to use clinics and hospitals when they get ill. This is slowing
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).1°9
3. G8 Policy Stance
The G8, an alliance of heads of state of major industrial democracies
that has been meeting annually since 1975 to address economic and
political issues, has similarly promoted the provision of free health services
in those countries that choose to provide them. The G8 issued a statement
in 2005 regarding fees for health services. It affirmed the core aims for
health and education that are outlined in the U.N. Millennium Declaration,
including reducing maternal mortality by three quarters by 2015.110 The G8
further noted:
We support our African partners' commitment to ensure that by
2015 all children have access to and complete free and compulsory
primary education of good quality, and have access to basic health
care (free wherever countries choose to provide this) to reduce
mortality among those most at risk from dying from preventable
causes, particularly women and children."l
The G8's stance can be seen as an implicit recognition that free health
care services are a social benefit and should be provided in those
circumstances when countries choose to offer them. However, as this
Article demonstrates, loan conditionality has made it difficult for
developing countries to freely choose to provide health care services free of
charge, even if they would like to do so. Indeed, bilateral donors continue
to strongly influence the structure of health care financing schemes.
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/.
109. Response on Oxfam's 'Make Free Public Health Care for All a Reality' Campaign,
Department for International Development (October 2008), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/
files/campaign-responses/oxfam-public-healthasp (commentary by Gillian Merron,
Parliamentary under Secretary of State for International Development).
110. G7/G8 Summit Meetings, Gleneagles Official Documents, Africa Gleneagles, at 17
(July 8, 2005), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/africa.html.
For a reference to the United Nations Millennium Declaration, see G.A. Res. [without
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4. NGOS
NGOs have largely denounced user fees as a barrier to access and
advocate for their removal. In a recent report, Oxfam, Action Global
Health, Medecins Du Monde, Save the Children, Plan, Global Health
Advocates, Act UP Paris, and Save the Children UK state that user fees
represent a failed financing mechanism. The report recommends
supporting those countries seeking to abolish user fees to expand universal
access.1 2 A Joint Statement by the Global Health Working Group at the
2008 G8 Summit signed by organizations including SIDACTION, Action
Canada for Population and Development, Treatment Action Campaign, the
Center for Women's Global Leadership, Global Health Council, Physicians
for Human Rights, Family Care International, and the Open Society
Institute states that G8 countries should promote maximizing access,
affordability, and availability of primary health care services, including the
removal of user fees.113 ActionAid International has called for the end of
user fees in a report "What Will it Take?" written as a call to action to
governments participating in the United Nations High-Level Meeting on
HIV and AIDS in 2006.114
III. USER FEES AND MATERNAL HEALTH
A. The Facts on Maternal Health in the Developing World
The aforementioned statistics on maternal death illustrate the grave
challenges that must be met by the international community. The chart
below" 5 presents the WHO's 2005 estimates of maternal mortality in
different regions of the world. As the Chart demonstrates, developing
countries bear a disproportionate burden of maternal deaths.
112. JOINT NGO BRIEFING PAPER, HEALTH INSURANCE IN Low-INCOME COUNTRIES. (2008),
available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ resources/ policy/ health/downloads/
bp1l2_healthjinsurance.pdf.
113. JOINT STATEMENT OF THE GLOBAL HEALTH WORKING GROUP, WE CAN No LONGER
WAIT JOINT STATEMENT BY THE GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY CONCERNING GLOBAL HEALTH (2008),
available at http://www.g8ngoforum.org/english/ 2008/06/joint-statement-global-health.htm
1.
114. ADM SHARMA, ACTIONAID, WHAT WILL IT TAKE? (2006) available at
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc-lib/236_1_what-will-it take.pdf.
115. Chart originally printed in MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2005, supra note 1, at 16.
Reprinted with permission from the World Health Organization, this chart should not be
reproduced for use in association with commercial nor promotional activities.
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Toble 2. Estimates of MAR, number of maternal deaths, lifetime risk, and range of uncertainty by
United Nations MDG regions, 20OS
Region MMF Lifetime Range of uncertainty on
(maternal Number of risk of MMR estimates
deaths per maternal maternal
100 000 deaths" death': Lower Upper
ve births) i in: estimate estimate
WORLD TOTAL 400 536000 92 220 650
Developed regions- 9 960 7300 8 17
Countries of the commonwealth of 51 1 800 1 200 28 140
independent states (CIS)5
Developing regions 450 533 000 75 240 730
Africa 820 276000 26 410 1 400
Northern Africa- 160 5700 210 B5 290
Sub-Shaian Affica j 900 270000 22 450 1 500
Asia 330 241 00O 120 190 520
EasternAsia 50 9 200 1 200 31 [ 80
South Asia 40 18 00 61 290 750
South-Eastern Asia 300 35000 130 160 550
Western Asia 160 8300 170 62 340
Latin America and the Carbbean 130 15000 290 81 230
Oceania 430 890 82 120 1200
In many developing countries, pregnancy and childbirth health
complications are a leading cause of death among women of reproductive
age." 6 The medical conditions contributing to maternal mortality include
hemorrhage, obstructed labor, eclampsia, infection, and abortion.117
Accessible and adequate medical care, particularly in rural regions that
have fewer maternal health services, can reduce maternal deaths. An
estimated 74% of deaths could be prevented if women had access to the
necessary medical interventions to address pregnancy and birth
complications. 118 In particular, essential obstetric care is one of the most
critical interventions needed to save lives.1 9
User fees may be best understood not in the abstract, but by looking
directly at their impact on individual women. Below are a few
representative stories from different regions of the world:
116. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, MATERNAL MORTALITY UPDATE 2002, A Focus
ON EMERGENCY OBSTETRIC CARE 5, available at http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib.pub-file/
201_filename mmupdate-2002.pdf.
117. Id. at 6.
118. KAREN LASHMAN, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, ACCELERATING REDUC7IONS IN
MATERNAL AND NEWBORN MORTALITY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNMES 1, available at
http://cdf.childrensdefense.org/site/DocServer/Accelerating-Reductions inMNM.pdf?doc
ID=2148.
119. A. WAGSTAFF & M. CLAESON, WORLD BANK, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
FOR HEALTH: RISING TO THE CHALLENGES (2004). 19
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* In the case of an obstetric emergency, it is often urgently
necessary to transfer a woman to a health facility with
more comprehensive medical care. The story of Amancio
and his wife Francisca demonstrates the fatal effect of
prohibitively costly transportation. Although Amancio
took his wife to the local health center when she began
experiencing labor pains, Francisca's severe case of
eclampsia and subsequent stroke required an immediate
transfer to a better-equipped hospital. Since the health
center refused to pay for an ambulance, Amancio was
forced to search for another form of transportation to take
his wife to the hospital. He was unable to find any
transport that was not prohibitively expensive, and
Francisca passed away before the needed transfer could
occur. 120 The refusal to pay for the ambulance as dictated
by Peruvian law effectively constituted a user fee.
* In some cases, the imposition of user fees does not
necessarily cause a fatal delay. Instead, women are
systematically deprived of their basic rights as a result of
failing to pay exorbitant fees for emergency obstetric care.
Human Rights Watch has documented the practice of
detaining women until they pay medical fees in a variety
of health facilities in Burundi. Like many of the women
who are detained, Agns I. delivered a baby by caesarean
section. She was unable to pay a bill equivalent to $235
and was effectively imprisoned at the Prince Louis
Rwagasore Clinic. Agns was forced to stay in the clinic's
lock-up for more than a month. She told human rights
researchers, "I have tried to get the money together but I
have not managed. I stay here, I cannot get out. I cannot
even go out to dry the clothes I have washed." Like the
other 20 women in the lock-up, Agns had been fruitlessly
searching for a "benefactor" to pay her bill. In the
meantime, she was simply locked in a small, dirty room
with numerous other women and their infants, manned by
security guards contracted privately by the hospital.1 21
* In the Indian province of Uttar Pradesh, the imposition of
user fees to care for Rama Devi's daughter did not lead to
a fatal delay but did impoverish the entire family.
120. ALICIA ELY YAMIN, DEADLY DELAYS: MATERNAL MORTALITY IN PERU 92-94 (2007).
121. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A HIGH PRICE TO PAY: DETENTION OF POOR PATIENTS IN
BURUNDIAN HOSPITALS (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11196/section/8.
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Rama's daughter-in-law had already died in childbirth because she
could not access care in a timely manner. She describes how user fees can
have a devastating effect on impoverished families even when there is
access to health care:
[W]hen it was my daughter's delivery we took her straight away to
a government hospital. There they asked us to pay Rupees 700 as
something called User Fee before anyone touched her. We told
them we were too poor to pay such a large amount, but no one
listened to us. We ended up using our life's savings for what we
thought would be free. We are so impoverished now there is not
even money to buy milk for my grandchild.122
B. User Fees: The Impact on Maternal Death
When women and their families confront user fees, they may delay
seeking care or avoid care altogether for fear of the financial burdens these
fees may impose.123 User fees are often charged at the time services are
rendered and, in certain circumstances, have inflexible payment systems,
such as not allowing credit arrangements.' 24 This payment structure leads
to lower utilization of health care services and poorer health outcomes. 125
Certain women seeking reproductive health services are particularly at
risk, as their ability to pay is also affected by power relationships in their
household and their lower social status compared to men.126
The adverse consequences of user fees on women are well-
documented. In the Zaria district of Nigeria, hospital records show that in
1983, with obstetric care provided free of charge, hospital staff performed
more than 6,000 deliveries, only two of which resulted in mortality. 127 By
1988, after the introduction and subsequent increases of user fees for
obstetric care, general obstetric admissions and deliveries had fallen by
more than half, and the incidence of maternal mortality had skyrocketed to
sixty-two per year.128 As the authors of the report noted, "[e]xempting
pregnant women from user fees is absolutely vital."129
The following examples highlight the detrimental effects that have
122. JAYEETA CHOWDHURY, ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING MATERNAL MORTALITY IN
U17AR PRADESH AND PAVING WAY FORWARD (2008), available at
http://www.genevahealthforum.org/ghf8/ files/ presentations/ Free%20Communications/ F
C004-1_Chowdhury,%20J.pdf.
123. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, FREEING Up HEALTHCARE: A GUIDE TO REMOVING USER FEES
1, 2, 16-17, 33-40 (2008).
124. WITrER, supra note 37, at 10 (comparing formal user fee payment structure to the more
flexible ones offered in Tanzania by traditional healers).
125. Id. at 7-17.
126. Id. at 11.
127. Kelsey A. Harrison, Maternal Mortality in Nigeria: The Real Issues, 1 AFR. J. REPROD.
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been felt by expectant mothers across the globe as a result of the imposition
of user fees:
* A 1996 study of user fees and exemptions in the Volta
region of Ghana found that official exemptions from user
fees were largely non-functional, with fewer than one in
1,000 patients granted exemptions. 130 Given the estimated
15 to 30% of the Volta region population that lives in
poverty, the study found that the malfunctioning of
exemptions effectively denied the poor access to health
services.131 The study further found that a "sustainable
inequity" had arisen in the region, in which fees generated
some revenue to allow service provision to continue for
some community members, while preventing others from
accessing these services. 32
* Research into the effects of user fees and community-
based insurance for health in Tanzania found that user fee
revenues were not distributed across the population in a
transparent way.13 3 The revenue was placed in an account
that predominantly benefited district hospitals' supply
purchases rather than community-level primary health
centers' supply purchases.1M Poor community members
failed to receive the user fee exemptions to which they
were entitled and were often unable to pay community
health insurance premiums. 135 The researchers concluded
that user fees in Tanzania were regressive and contributed
to the exclusion of the poor and vulnerable groups from
basic health services, including pregnant women from
poor households. 136  The fees may also impact poor
households by forcing poor persons to resort to desperate
measures, such as taking out loans, decreasing food
consumption to save money, and selling necessary
productive assets. 137
" A case study of user fees at a district hospital in Kirivong
Operational District in Cambodia concluded that the
imposition of user fees created a "medical poverty trap"
that, in turn, could lead to greater morbidity, less access to
care, unpredictable use of drugs, and impoverishment.
130. Frank Nyonator & Joseph Kutzin, Health for Some? The Effects of User Fees in the Volta
Region of Ghana, 14 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 329, 329 (1999).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Laterveer et al., supra note 89, at v.
134. Id. at 36.
135. Id. at 37.
136. Id. at vi.
137. Id. at 23.
2009]
22
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol12/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
Individuals fell prey to the "poverty trap" when, unable to
afford public health care, they visited private practitioners.
In response to the increased demand, the private
practitioners increased their fees over time, with the price
per treatment more than tripling from about six to twenty
dollars. The private sector's profiteering, combined with
patients' delay in seeking treatment, created a "trap" in
which individuals sought public medical care only when
they were really sick and therefore in need of more costly
treatments. 13
8
In the deprived district of Koppal, India, the government's failure to
appropriately acknowledge and be accountable for gender bias has
contributed to high maternal mortality.1 39 Although the government has
recommended that women deliver babies in public health facilities with
trained health workers, it also charges women for ambulance transport.140
The researchers in the Koppal, India study argue that the health system
suffers from an inequitable structure and financing scheme that does not
meet pregnant women's needs and is in need of reform.14 '
IV. EFFICACY OF USER FEES: HAVE THEY MET THEIR INTENDED GOALS?
The stated goals of user fees are: 1) revenue generation; 2) increased
efficiency; 3) better quality medical services; 4) promotion of equity; and 5)
an administrative decentralization to provide a measure of accountability
and a vehicle for community participation. 142 Decades of experience with
user fees in the field, however, demonstrate that user fees fall short of these
intended goals. 143 Even for smaller, more discrete items like drugs and
medical supplies, studies suggest that user fees do not meet their revenue-
generating goals.'"
User fees suffer from the following weaknesses:
* Exemptions do not effectively reach those persons most in
need;
* Users fees are ineffective as means of health system financing;
* They deter the poorest individuals, often those most in need of
care, from accessing health services;
138. Bart Jacobs & Neil Price, The Impact of the Introduction of User Fees at a District Hospital
in Cambodia, 19 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN 310, 317 (2004).
139. Asha George et al., Gendered Health Systems Biased Against Maternal Survival:
Preliminary Findings from Koppal, Karnataka, India 1 (Inst. Dev. Studs, Working Paper No. 253,
2005).
140. Id. at 24.
141. Id. at 36.
142. See, e.g., HUTTON, supra note 19, § 2.6.
143. ELDIS, Experiences With User Fees for Health: A Quick Guide Through the Key Issues,
http://www.eldis.org/index.cfm?objectld=23545ABB-F639-5CBF-CDB5El7EF62E5CE6 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2009).
144. Brian Abel-Smith & Pankaj Rawall, Can the Poor Afford "Free" Health Services? A Case
Study of Tanzania, 7 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 329, 334 (1992); Nanda, supra note 22, at 129.
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" They have not reduced the demand for services; and
• They have failed to galvanize community participation in
health care financing.145
A. Exemptions Have Not Reached Those in Most Critical Need
Many countries that have implemented user fees have tried to reduce
their harmful effects on pregnant women by either eliminating fees for
reproductive health care, while preserving them for other kinds of health
care, 146 or exempting those who cannot afford the fees. These exemptions
have largely failed. 47
First, the exemptions are not uniformly applied.148 Some health care
centers and administrators do know when to grant exemptions. 49 Others
favor some members of the population over others, so exemptions are not
necessarily distributed on the basis of ability to pay.15° For example,
studies have shown that since exemption processes are not routinely
monitored, they are issued on a somewhat arbitrary, discretionary basis by
healthcare workers.15'
Even if exemptions were designed to be uniformly applied with
explicit income cutoffs, many individuals would not qualify. This is in part
because many developing countries have large informal sectors, with
citizens who cannot provide official income documentation. 52 It is difficult
and unreliable to identify the very poor in economies with large informal
employment sectors and/or a large number of subsistence farmers. 53 In
addition, it can be expensive to collect up-to-date poverty statistics for
communities with a small "cash economy" and many members who float
in and out of designated poverty thresholds. 54 Means testing has been the
most common form of establishing exemption thresholds, but the criteria
used are typically vague, leaving an opening for administrative discretion
145. See ELDIS, supra note 143; Nanda, supra note 22, at 127.
146. See, e.g., SOPHIE WIlTER ET AL., The Experience of Ghana in Implementing a User Fee
Exemption Policy to Provide Free Delivery Care, 15 REPROD. HEALTH MATrERS 61, 62-63 (2007).
147. Nanda, supra note 22, at 131-32.
148. Id.
149. See Suneeta Sharma et al., Formal and Informal Fees for Maternal Health Care - Health
Care Services in Five Countries: Policies, Practices, and Perspectives 21-24 (USAID, Policy Working
Paper Series No. 16, 2005) (describing variation in health care providers' knowledge of
authorized health care charges).
150. Nanda, supra note 22, at 132 ("[Tihe evidence suggests that exemptions are
vulnerable to subjectivity and distortion."). Indeed, as mentioned before, in a study of
twenty-five African countries in the mid-1990s, only fifteen had user fee exemptions, and only
one had clearly delineated income limits that qualified for the exemption. Witter, supra note
37, at 7.
151. Nanda, supra note 22, at 132.
152. WITTER, supra note 37, at 7.
153. ELDIS, Goal 3: Equity, http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/health-
systems/key-issues/user-fees/experiences/goal-3-equity (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) (noting
the challenges involved in identifying the poor).
154. CHER, supra note 27, at 8.
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and corruption155
Governments designing exemptions in such economies are confronted
with the choices of either using broad categories, and thereby allowing
benefits to "leak" to others, or narrow categories, which are under-
inclusive and fail to reach some individuals in critical need of an
exemption.15 6 If the criteria are too broad, the state's limited financial
resources may be channeled to members of the population who are not the
most in need. If too narrow, inequalities in access to health care result, as
some of the poorest citizens who are not able to qualify for exemptions do
not receive medical care.
Furthermore, women in countries that either have free reproductive
health care services or exemptions do not always know that they are
eligible. 5 7 Staff members at health care centers and hospitals are often
equally unaware of the fee exemptions. Moreover, women who mistakenly
think that they will be charged for reproductive health care might avoid
the health care facilities altogether,15 8 even though the services there would
be free.
In addition, the fear of social stigmatization is high, leading some
individuals not to claim exemptions even if eligible. 15 9 A single mother of
four in Tanzania explained, "[I]t was very difficult to get exemption
because I had to kneel down before the ten cell leader [a local leader],
village council, teachers, guardians in the family, and everybody I felt
would sympathize with my problems . . . it cost me my dignity as a
mother."'160 These factors help explain why Ghana's comprehensive fee
exemption system led to fewer than one in 1,000 patients actually receiving
waivers.161
Ghana's dysfunctional waiver system reflects another detrimental
factor: disincentives to staff for granting exemptions. Because central
government agencies do not adequately compensate facilities for waivers,
health care centers that keep received user fees have a financial incentive to
avoid exemptions.162
Peru, where recent policy reforms aim to provide maternal health care
for free, is a case in point.163 According to the local law, districts where
more than 65% of the population lives in poverty qualify for universal free
coverage under the national insurance plan. 6' The law stipulates that free
care includes "prenatal care, normal and high risk deliveries, transfers
155. Id. See also Nanda, supra note 22, at 132 ("[Tihe evidence suggests that exemptions
are vulnerable to subjectivity and distortion.").
156. WrITER, supra note 37, at 7.
157. Nanda, supra note 22, at 132.
158. Sharma et al., supra note 139, at 39 (describing misconceptions among women about
health care charges).
159. CHER, supra note 27, at 8.
160. Id. at 13.
161. Nyonator & Kutzin, supra note 130, at 329.
162. Tim Ensor & Jeptepkeny Ronoh, Effective Financing of Maternal Health Services: A
Review of the Literature, 75 HEALTH POL'Y 49, 56 (2005).
163. Sharma et al., supra note 149, at 12.
164. YAMIN, supra note 120, at32.
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during obstetric emergencies, coverage for costs related to funerals, care for
42 days after delivery, and care for various other health problems related to
pregnancy." 165 Health clinics often lack the resources to provide these
services without charging users fees, however, and investigations have
found that government reimbursements to health facilities that provide
ostensibly free services only partially cover the costs of care.166
B. User Fees Have Failed to Generate Significant Revenue
When health facilities lack the requisite revenue to operate, they are
often constrained to the point that they begin to informally charge patients
for care that should technically be free of charge. 167 The failure of user fee
waivers to remedy a lack of revenue to support health care infrastructure
raises the important question of how well user fees have performed as a
means of mobilizing financial resources for medical care in the first place.
Based on the evidence, they appear to have fallen well short of the goals set
out by the World Bank at the inception of the Bamako Initiative. Save the
Children reports that they have generated on average only 5 to 7% of
recurrent budgets for health care.168 Research in Tanzania found that user
fee revenues were lower than projected, at around 0.6% of the overall
health budget.169 In Zimbabwe, the revenue generated from user fees from
the mid-1980s to the early 1990s equaled only 1 to 2% of the Ministry of
Health's recurrent expenditure.170 User fees have largely failed to meet set
financing targets of 10 to 20% endorsed by the WHO and its counterparts
in the 1990s. 17 1 In some cases, user fees have replaced central government
funding, resulting in no net gain in health care funding.1 72 In countries
such as Ethiopia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, user fee revenues were sent to
the central treasury, while in others the central ministry has withdrawn
funding under the belief that the decentralized fee collection systems
should be sufficient. 173 There is some evidence that user fees have helped
increase revenue for maintaining an adequate stock of drugs174 or for
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Evgenia Delcheva et al., Under-the-Counter Payments for Health Care: Evidence
from Bulgaria, 42 HEALTH POL'Y 89 (1997) (noting that although informal payments for health
services are widely regarded as a negative phenomenon, nearly 43% of patients in Bulgaria
paid for services that were officially free).
168. WITTER, supra note 37, at 14.
169. LATERVEER ET AL., supra note 133, 36.
170. MEREDETH TURSHEN, PRIVATIZING HEALTH SERVICES IN AFRICA 35 (1999).
171. A. CREESE & J. KUTzIN, WHO, CAN USER FEES IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 8-12 (1995). But see LATERVEER ET AL., supra note 89 (noting that
although statistics on user fee revenues in Tanzania are hard to generate, user fees comprise
an estimated 10.5% of the budget of the district health care system).
172. ELDIS, Goal 6: Quality, http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/health-
systems/key-issues/user-fees/experiences/goal-6-quality (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
173. Id.
174. Walter Kipp et al., User Fees, Health Staff Incentives, and Service Utilization in Kabarole
District, Uganda, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1032, 1035 (2001).
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satisfying non-salary operating costs.175 However, these costs typically
account for less than 30% of total health sector costs. 76 Even where studies
indicate that user fees have had a positive effect on expanding basic health
care to the poor, the costs of collecting user fees - including staff time and
material costs for issuing receipts, accounting, managing money, and
banking - have received little attention.177
C. User Fees Have Failed to Substantially Increase Efficiency
What about efficiency? Even if user fees do not provide significant
revenues to health care facilities, they may plausibly affect demand in
setting higher prices for higher levels of care. For example, user fees may
provide incentives for women to seek treatment at primary care facilities
instead of at hospitals, or to opt for natural delivery instead of cesarean
section. But in practice, few user fee schemes penalize patients for
receiving higher levels of care than necessary. 7 8
More importantly for the purpose of lowering maternal mortality, the
type of frivolous treatment that cost-sharing addresses in health care
systems of affluent countries simply does not apply in the context of
developing countries. Women who die of pregnancy complications in
developing countries face highly limited choices in the type of care, if any,
that they will receive. The deterrent effect of user fees more often leads
these women to under-utilize health services, which in turn leads to
increases in surgical intervention and curative services, as the data from
Nigeria and many other countries demonstrate. 179
D. There is No Consensus on Whether User Fees Have Increased
Quality
There is some evidence that where services are available, charging
modest fees increases quality. For example, after user fees were instituted
in Niger, primary care services increased in number and quality, and drug
availability increased. 180 In Zambia, user fees appear to have enabled local
primary care facilities to offer some services formerly available only at
hospitals. 181
175. Nyonator, supra note 167, at 329.
176. D. Arhin-Tenkorang, Mobilizing Resources for Health: The Case for User Fees Revisited, 13
(World Health Org. Commission on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper No. WG3,
2000).
177. See CREESE, supra note 171, at 20-21 (discussing difficulty of managing user fees).
178. ELDIS, Goal 2: Efficiency, http://www.eldis.org/go/ topics/ resource-guides/ health-
systems/ key-issues/ user-fees/ experiences/ goal-2-efficiency (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).
179. Harrison, supra note 127, at 4.4.
180. ELDIS, Goal 4, http://www.eldis.org/index.cfm?objectld=E78EBC75-0648-3F4F-
AC171C122D244B52 (citing F.D. Dion, Assessment of Niger's National Cost Recovery Policy
Implementation in the Primary Health Care Sector x-xii (Partnerships for Health Reform,
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But other evidence contradicts these findings. In Uganda, the abolition
of user fees for primary care services was found to improve access to
quality services for the poor. 182 Indeed, there was increased demand for
health services, as outpatient attendances increased by 155% and
immunization rates increased from 48 to 89%.183 The World Bank found
that the abolition of user fees in particular was a benefit to poor persons.
For adults, almost half the total benefit accrued to the bottom quintile, and
more than two thirds of the benefits benefited those in the bottom two
quintiles.184
Local control of revenues is a significant factor in determining the
efficacy of user fees. 8 5 In some countries, however, user fees simply
replace central government funding. 86 As a result, user fees mask the poor
performance of states in fulfilling their duty to promote their citizens' right
to health "by all appropriate means."'18 7
E. User Fees Have Not Increased Equity in Access to Health Care
Given the failure of exemptions systems to properly function for the
poor, studies have concluded that the overall utilization of health services
decreases by up to 40 to 50% where user fees are in place. 188 This decrease
is not in "frivolous" services, one of the intended goals of imposing user
fees. Rather, the very poor and those in remote areas tend to reduce their
consumption of all health services, including those that are critically
needed.189 A Save the Children study in Burundi found that when user
fees were the primary health-financing system, the rates of non-
consultation were significantly higher in poor groups, at 13%, than they
were in wealthier groups, at 6%.190 Further, in countries such as Tanzania,
sick individuals increasingly resorted to traditional healers, who charged
for services but often offered cheaper fees and more flexible payment
systems, including payment in kind and credit arrangements.' 91
Those who are poor and live in remote regions will decrease their use
of health care more than the wealthy since their demand for health is more
182. Klaus Deininger & Paul Mpuga, Economic and Welfare Impact of the Abolition of Health
User fees: Evidence from Uganda, 14 J. AFR. ECON. 1, 55-91 (2005) (looking at Uganda household
data for the years 1999-2000 and 2002-2003, both before and after user fees were eliminated
and concluding that access and health outcomes were better after user fees were eliminated
but that these improvements could be overshadowed by declining quality of health care if
adequate investments are not made in the health care system).
183. ROB YATES, DFID HEALTH RESOURCE CENTER, INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES IN
REMOVING USER FEES FOR HEALTH SERVICES - IMPLICATIONS FOR MOZAMBIQUE 9 (2006)
www.dfidhealthrc.org/publications/healthsectorfinancing/06Yates0l.pdf.
184. Id. at 11.
185. Kipp, supra note 174, at 1033.
186. ELDIS, supra note 172.
187. ICESCR, supra note 24, art. 2.
188. WITTER, supra note 37, at 1.
189. See FREEING uP HEALTHCARE, supra note 123, at 1-4.
190. WITTER, supra note 37, at 10.
191. Id.
Answering the Millennium Callfor Maternal Health
28
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol12/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
elastic than that of the rich. 192 One study on user fees identified the
following factors, in addition to poverty and geographic disadvantage, that
contribute to this greater elasticity of demand: uncertainty of medical
service prices, great indirect costs including costs to access health facilities,
and seasonal variation in ability to pay. 93 Individuals may delay in
seeking care, attempt to self-medicate, or resort to alternative methods of
care like traditional medicine instead of seeking professional medical care,
even in the face of serious illness. The net result is that user fees dissuade
the use of health care services by economically and geographically
disadvantaged members of the population, thereby failing to promote
equity in access to health care.
F. User Fees Have Not Successfully Decentralized Administration
of Health Care
While the goals of administrative decentralization, which include
increased accountability and community participation in health care
decision, are laudable, the experience of user fees points to their failure in
meeting this goal in many countries. In Uganda, a decentralized
administration has not led to increased accountability because in practice
management structures at the local level have been unclear, accounting
procedures for collecting and redistributing revenues have been weak, and
guidelines for health center operational and financial administration have
been largely absent.194 Furthermore, when management structures are
weak, they are often also inefficient. This results in high transaction costs,
with funds that could otherwise be directed to health services and goods
being spent on administrative costs.' 95
V. USER FEES' IMPACT ON MATERNAL HEALTH: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS
The prior section highlighted how user fees have fallen far short of the
economic and structural goals that served as a basis for their
implementation. Despite these failures, they remain in place in many
states in the developing world. How can their continued use be reconciled
with these states' obligations under international human rights law? What
do the relevant treaties and conventions advise regarding governments'
health care policy and planning, and user fees more specifically?
192. [d. at 11.
193. Id. at 9-10.
194. Id.
195. MARK PEARSON, DFID HEALTH SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE, ISSUES PAPER: THE CASE
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Recognition of maternal death as a human rights issue has grown.196
Maternal death is not only a "health disadvantage," it is a "social
disadvantage." 197 Maternal death functions as a powerful sign of the social
and economic disparities and inequities between men and women in many
societies. Roughly 70% of the world's poor are women.19 8 In many
developing countries, women use health care more frequently than men.199
Reproductive health care services constitute the largest component of that
care. 200 In comparison to men, many women have reduced access to basic
health and nutrition services. 201  Furthermore, among the overall
population of women, maternal death disproportionately affects women
who are poor, located in remote regions, or belong to ethnic, cultural, or
religious minority groups.20 2
Studying user fees from within a human rights framework allows us to
more clearly understand how states fail to respect, protect, and fulfill
legally binding obligations to women who are pregnant or of reproductive
age. This understanding provides a basis for further advocacy to eliminate
user fees and bring states into compliance with the Millennium
Development Goals. Furthermore, a human rights framework provides the
opportunity for increased enforcement of those rights on both an
international and domestic level, even though such enforcement currently
remains in its early stages.
A. Human Rights: A Legal Basis
Human rights are codified in international conventions and treaties.
Relevant international treaties include the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR),23 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 204 the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),2 5 the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
196. See, e.g., R. COOK ET AL., WHO, ADVANCING SAFE MOTHERHOOD THROUGH HUMAN
RIGHTS (2001) (setting out one of the first comprehensive evaluations of maternal mortality
within a human rights framework).
197. WHO, REDUCTION OF MATERNAL MORTALITY 2 (1999), http://www.who.int/
reproductive-health/ publications/ reduction of-maternal-mortality/e-rmm.pdf.
198. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 22, at 128.
199. J. Nabyonga et al., Abolition of Cost-Sharing is Pro-Poor: Evidence from Uganda, 20
HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 100, 100 (2005).
200. Nanda, supra note 22, at 128.
201. Id.
202. Tricia McCarter-Joseph, High Maternal Death Rates Among Minority Women, 97 J. NAT'L
MED. ASS'N 1443,1443 (2005), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.
fcgi?artid=2594695.
203. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
204. ICESCR, supra note 24.
205. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
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(CERD),2 6 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 20 7
Additionally, regional treaties often reinforce the rights protected in
international treaties; for example, both the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights2 8 and the Protocol of San Salvador codify many of the
relevant human rights principles. 2 9  Taken together, these treaties
represent binding international law which can be used to address the issue
of maternal mortality and the impact of user fees.
Because human rights are codified in binding international treaties,
governments that ratify them are obligated to ensure that their laws and
policies are in conformity with those rights.210 By becoming a party or
signatory to an international treaty, a state assumes the obligation to
respect, protect and fulfill the human rights detailed therein. 211
Governments commit to enact appropriate domestic legislation and take
other necessary actions to ensure they fulfill their treaty obligations. 212
Most developing countries have committed to at least one of the key
human rights treaties that provide for the rights to health, life and non-
discrimination. 213 Overall, there are 153 state parties to the ICESCR, 156
state parties to the ICCPR, 183 state parties to CEDAW, and 192 state
parties to the CRC.2 14 In particular, the high number of signatories to
CEDAW should be noted, since that convention most specifically codifies
the human rights related to maternal mortality.215
Within the U.N. treaty system, State parties typically submit periodic
reports to a treaty body committee, which reviews the periodic report to
ensure that the state is in compliance with the treaty's binding legal
206. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Dec.
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
207. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. It
should also be noted that since adolescent pregnancy is prevalent worldwide, many young
mothers fall within the scope of CRC.
208. Banjul [African] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
209. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Protocol of San Salvador," O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (entered
into force Nov. 16, 1999).
210. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International
Human Rights Law, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/
InternationalLaw.aspx ("International human rights law lays down obligations which States
are bound to respect.").
211. Id. ("The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from interfering with or
curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires States to protect
individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfill means that
States must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.").
212. Id.
213. For a full listing of the relevant human rights treaties and their respective
ratifications, see U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Body
Database, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.
214. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 12 (2006),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/ RatificationStatus.pdf.
215. The countries which have not signed CEDAW are extremely limited, including only
the following: the Cook Islands, the Holy See, Iran, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Qatar, Somalia,
Sudan, and Tonga. See id. at 2-12.
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obligations. 216 More specifically, CEDAW Committee monitors compliance
with CEDAW, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
monitors compliance with the JCESCR, and the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) monitors compliance with the ICCPR. As discussed below, these
committees monitor state efforts to reduce maternal mortality and have
voiced concern regarding the prevalence of user fees in developing
countries.
When a state party does not adhere to its obligations, most treaty
bodies have few concrete enforcement mechanisms with which to mandate
compliance; the onus falls on the state to ensure compliance.217 Somewhat
limited compliance mechanisms do exist, however, in the form of optional
protocols to some of the U.N. treaties. Both the ICCPR and CEDAW
treaties have optional protocols which have been signed and ratified by
numerous states. 218 Both of these optional protocols set out a complaint
process through which individuals who have exhausted domestic judicial
remedies may sue to protect their rights under the ICCPR and CEDAW,
respectively. 219 An optional protocol to the ICESCR is also now open for
signature, promising the expansion of opportunities for the enforcement of
the right to health in the states which ratify the protocol. The CEDAW
Committee has heard a variety of cases involving discrimination against
women. More specifically, the decision in A.S. v. Hungary demonstrates
the justiciability of the right to health, ruling that the coercive sterilization
of a Roma woman in Hungary violated her right to health as protected
under Article 12 of CEDAW.220 There is also a case currently pending
before the CEDAW Committee arguing that Brazil has not met its treaty
obligations with respect to reducing cases of preventable maternal
mortality. 221 The increased focus on international cases designed to enforce
the right to health and the right to non-discrimination can lay the
groundwork for changes in national public health systems. Furthermore,
these international cases can theoretically set the stage for domestic
enforcement of international human rights law.
216. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx.
217. See, e.g., Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 2 (2002).
218. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. A/54/4, U.N. Doc. A/54/59 (Oct. 6, 1999) [hereinafter CEDAW Optional
Protocol]. Seventy-nine countries are signatories to the CEDAW Optional Protocol and 105
countries are signatories to the ICCPR Optional Protocol. Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 214.
219. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 218.
220. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women under Article 7, Paragraph 3, of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, 18, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004 (Feb. 12, 2004).
221. Center for Reproductive Rights, Center Challenges Brazil's Record on Maternal Mortality
(Dec. 7, 2007), http://reproductiverights.org/en/ press-room/center-challenges-brazils-
record-on-maternal-mortality (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
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There are also critical, albeit non-binding, international consensus
documents related to maternal mortality. The Programme of Action
resulting from the International Conference on Population and
Development (Cairo Programme of Action) was signed by numerous
countries. The Cairo Programme of Action provides a key working
definition of reproductive health; it also builds on the principles found in
international treaties, stating that "reproductive rights embrace certain
human rights that are already recognized in national laws, international
human rights documents and other consensus documents. These rights
rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to ...
the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive
health." 222 The five-year review document on the Cairo Programme of
Action focuses on maternal mortality, stating that governments must:
Ensure that the reduction of maternal morbidity and mortality is a
health sector priority and that women have ready access to
essential obstetric care, well-equipped and adequately staffed
maternal healthcare services, skilled attendance at delivery,
emergency obstetric care, effective referral and transport to higher
levels of care when necessary, post-partum care and family
planning. In health sector reform, the reduction of maternal
mortality and morbidity should be prominent and used as an
indicator for the success of such reform.223
The Millennium Development Goals have also provided a rallying
point for the reduction of maternal mortality.224 Within the U.N. system,
the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the right to health have
recently focused on the issue of maternal mortality, providing more
interpretive guidance relating to the right codified in international law. 225
The combination of international law standards and growing
international consensus is important not only because it requires states to
act in certain ways, but also because it implicates donors and international
lending institutions. Under international law, all states are obligated to
work toward the full realization of the right to health, including through
the provision of international assistance to other states.226 "Depending on
the availability of resources, States should facilitate access to essential
222. International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo Programme of Action
(Cairo Consensus), 7.3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.171/13/Rev.1 (Oct. 18, 1994), available at
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html.
223. Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International
Conference on Population and Development, 62(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-21/2 (Nov. 8, 1999).
224. See UNDP Goal 5 Report, supra note 3.
225. The Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, 7-36, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/338 (Sept. 13, 2006).
226. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising
in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,




Hall et al.: Answering the Millennium Call for the Right to Maternal Health: The Need to Eliminate User Fees
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
Answering the Millennium Callfor Maternal Health
health facilities, goods and services in other countries, wherever possible
and provide the necessary aid when required." 227 Additionally, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health argues that "developed states
should ensure that their international development assistance, and other
policies, support health systems' strengthening and other relevant policies
in developing countries."2 28
Maternal mortality and maternal health are connected to numerous
human rights, including the fundamental rights to health, life, and non-
discrimination. The following analysis defines these human rights and
then assesses how state parties and international lending institutions that
mandate the imposition of user fees fall short of meeting the relevant
obligations.
B. The Right to Health
The right to health is protected by numerous international legal
instruments. In accordance with Article 12.1 of the ICESCR, state parties
recognize "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health." 229 Additionally, Article 12.1(d)
requires "[tlhe creation of conditions which would assure to all medical
service and medical attention in the event of sickness." 230 Article 10(2)
specifically adds that "[s]pecial protection should be accorded to mothers
during a reasonable period before and after childbirth."231  CEDAW
explicitly provides for the right to certain critical health services for
pregnant women, emphasizing that these services shall be "free ... where
necessary. ' 232 Under CEDAW Article 12(2), governments must provide
access to "appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement
and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well
as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation." 233 In addition to
this provision touching on user fees, the CEDAW Committee has noted
that some women lack the funds to receive care, and hence it becomes the
"duty of States parties to ensure women's right to safe motherhood and
emergency obstetric services and they should allocate to these services the
maximum extent of available resources."234 Beyond these two core treaties,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),235 the Convention on
227. Id. 39.
228. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 225.
229. ICESCR, supra note 24, art. 12.
230. Id. art. 12(d).
231. Id. art. 10(2).
232. CEDAW, supra note 205, art. 12.
233. Id. art. 12(2).
234. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 24: Art. 12 of CEDAW - Women and
Health, 27, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (Aug. 20, 1999) [hereinafter General Recommendation
No. 24].
235. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(noting that "[elveryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health ... of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
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the Rights of the Child (CRC),236 the Protocol of San Salvador,237 and the
African Charter 23 8 also obligate governments to protect maternal health.239
All of these treaties are binding on their signatories but, as mentioned
before, the treaty bodies that monitor states' compliance with these
mandates generally lack efficient enforcement mechanisms. 240
It is also important to keep in mind that the right to health
fundamentally implicates the attainment of other human rights. When user
fees interfere with the fulfillment of the right to health, they necessarily
implicate other human rights.
Overall, States must respect, protect and fulfill the right to health.241
The U.N. CEDAW Committee stipulates that to fulfill their obligation to
respect the right to health, states must refrain from interfering directly or
indirectly with the right to health:
For example, States parties should not restrict women's access to
health services or to the clinics that provide those services on the
ground that women do not have the authorization of husbands,
partners, parents or health authorities, because they are unmarried
or because they are women. Other barriers to women's access to
appropriate health care include laws that criminalize medical
procedures only needed by women and that punish women who
undergo those procedures.242
Beyond refraining from interfering with the right to health, states must
take appropriate measures to fully realize this right.243 To this end, states
must take positive actions through legislation, policies, and administrative
measures. 244 However, subsequent interpretive guidelines, such as the
Limburg Principles, make clear that "under no circumstances shall [the
principle of progressive realization] be interpreted as implying for States
the right to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full realization." 245
social services").
236. CRC, supra note 207, art. 24 (recognizing the "right of the child to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health").
237. Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Protocol of San Salvador,
arts. 10 and 15., Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69.
238. Banjul [African] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 208, art. 16.
239. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 14, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) ("Every child shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state
of physical, mental and spiritual health.").
240. See, e.g., Collingsworth, supra note 217.
241. General Comment 14, supra note 226, 33.
242. General Recommendation 24, supra note 234, T 14.
243. General Comment 14, supra note 226, 33. See also General Recommendation No. 24,
supra note 234, 14-17.
244. ICESCR, supra note 24, art. 2(1).
245. The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, r 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17/Annex (1987),
reprinted in The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 122, 125 (1987). See also The Maastricht
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In meeting their international obligations for the attainment of the right
to health, states parties have certain critical obligations which take
immediate effect and others that may be progressively realized over
time.246 The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) has issued General Comment 14 to provide an authoritative
interpretation of ICESCR Article 12. Under General Comment 14, states
have an immediate obligation to guarantee that the right to health will be
exercised in a non-discriminatory manner.247 States also have a core
obligation to ensure minimum essential levels of the right to health; this
means that states have a duty to guarantee essential primary health care,
including maternal health care.248
At the same time, the CESCR recognizes that State parties may not
immediately be able to fully meet "the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health." Hence, the General Comment 14 directs
governments to take "deliberate, concrete, and targeted" steps towards the
"full realization of the right to health" under Article 12, and that they must
do so to maximize the utilization of available resources.249 If resources are
limited, states are expected to prioritize key interventions first, including
those that will guarantee maternal health.250 Additionally, the obligation
"requires States parties to move as expeditiously as possible towards the
realization of the rights .... [A]II states parties have the obligation to begin
immediately to take steps to fulfill their obligations under the
Covenant."251
C. Elements of the Right to Health
The right to health incorporates four interrelated and essential
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1 8, 20 HuM. RTs. Q. 691, 694-95
(1998) (echoing this sentiment and establishing that the state bears the burden of proof to
demonstrate measurable progress toward the realization of the given right).
246. See General Comment 14, supra note 226, 30.
247. Id.
248. Id. 43. Additionally, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women emphasizes state obligations "to take appropriate legislative, judicial, administrative,
budgetary, economic and other measures to the maximum extent of their available resources
to ensure that women realize their rights to health care." General Recommendation 24, supra
note 234, 17.
249. General Comment 14, supra note 226, 30. "[P]rogressive realization means that
States are expected to do better next year than they are doing today, while resource
availability acknowledges that what is required of a rich country is of a higher standard than
what is required of a low- or middle-income country." The Special Rapporteur, Report Of The
Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of
Physical and Mental Health, delivered to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/4/28 (Jan. 17,
2007).
250. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), STATE OF THE WORLD POPULATION 2004:
MATERNAL HEALTH, http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2004/english/ch7/index.htm (noting that
the U.N. Millennium Summit in 2000 "identified maternal health as an urgent priority in the
fight against poverty").
251. The Limburg Principles, supra note 245.
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elements: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality.252
1. Availability
States must ensure that an adequate supply of goods, services, and
facilities are available for maternal health.2 53 For example, this includes
ensuring an adequate supply of maternity-related health care services and
health professionals. The ICESCR has noted that the "precise ... services
will vary depending on numerous factors, including the State party's
development level."2 54  However, the services will include basic
"determinants of health, such as . . . health related buildings, trained
medical personnel.. .and essential drugs."255
2. Accessibility
Several components contribute to making health care services
"accessible." First, health services must be physically accessible. 25 6
Physical access to health services is often a key determinant in women's
decisions about whether or not to seek care. 25 7 Significant geographical
barriers impede many women's access to maternal health services. 258
Faced with potentially life-threatening medical conditions, these women
may not receive care because the time and distance to nearby medical
facilities are simply too great.25 9 Furthermore, the greater the physical
distance of health care services from their home, the greater the costs of
transportation and food to seek care. Particularly in rural areas, the high
cost of transportation acts as an informal cost barrier, thereby discouraging
women from seeking necessary obstetric care. 260  In many countries,
reducing maternal mortality will depend on making relevant services more
physically accessible, particularly to women in underserved areas.
Second, health services must be economically accessible and any
payments for health services should be equitable. According to the
CESCR:
[Playment for health-care services, as well as services related to the
underlying determinants of health, has to be based on the principle
of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately or





257. See, e.g., KIRSTAN HAWKINS ET AL., DFID, DEVELOPING A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH TO ADDRESSING MATERNAL MORTALITY 20 (2005), http://www.hurilink.org/ tools/
DevelopingaHRBA toMaternalMortality--DFID.pdf.
258. Id. at 20. See also World Bank, Maternal Mortality and Morbidity,
http://go.worldbank.org/6PFOLE29QO.
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publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially
disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that poorer households
should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses
as compared to richer households. '" 261
Accessibility also implicates other aspects of the right to health,
including non-discrimination and equal treatment in access to care.
Discriminatory social norms can lead to unequal access. 262 In particular,
discrimination against women and barriers to accessing health services
including limited education and information can impact the realization of
the right to health and contribute to greater inequality. 263 In order to
remedy inequalities in access to care, governments must address
discriminatory laws, policies, and practices in health care and in society
that prevent women from accessing maternal health services. 264
Article 12 of the ICESCR guarantees information accessibility, which
includes "the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
concerning health issues." 265 Laws or policies that restrict women's access
to appropriate reproductive health services can lead to maternal
mortality. 266
3. Acceptability
In the context of maternal mortality, acceptability generally addresses
issues of cultural sensitivity to maternal health concerns. Preventing
maternal mortality and enhancing access to maternal health care is not
simply a matter of scaling up technical interventions or making those
interventions more affordable. Also important are strategies to ensure that
the services, including childbirth practices, are sensitive to the cultures and
requirements of all women, including those from indigenous populations
and other minority groups.267
261. General Comment 14, supra note 226, 12(b).
262. Id 18.
263. Id. 21.
264. WHO, MAKING A DIFFERENCE IN COUNTRIES: STRATEGIC APPROACH TO IMPROVING
MATERNAL AND NEWBORN SURVIVAL AND HEALTH 21 (2006).
265. General Comment 14, supra note 226, 12(b)(iv).
266. General Recommendation 24, supra note 235, 17 ("Studies such as those which
emphasize the high maternal mortality and morbidity rates worldwide and the large numbers
of couples who would like to limit their family size but lack access to or do not use any form
of contraception provide an important indication for State parties of possible breaches of their
duties to ensure women's access to health care."). See also Kathleen Henry Shears, Increasing
Contraception Reduces Abortion: Complex Relationship Between Contraception and Induced Abortion
Grows Clearer, 21 NETWORK 4 (2002).
267. See General Comment 14, supra note 226, 12(c) ("All health facilities, goods and
services must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the
culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and communities, sensitive to gender and life-cycle
requirements, as well as being designed to respect confidentiality and improve the health
status of those concerned.").
Answering the Millennium Call for Maternal Health
38
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol12/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
Addressing cultural sensitivity can advance development indicators.
In Guatemala, a country with one of the highest maternal mortality ratios
in Latin America, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) helped
forge a cultural dialogue that included the Catholic Church, evangelical
denominations, professional associations, trade unions, and business
leaders. 268 These parties formed an alliance that urged the enactment of a
law promoting better health for women and their families.269
4. Quality
The quality of care influences the outcome of interventions. Without
quality care, women who seek medical treatment will still confront great
risk of death or disability.270 The right to health includes an entitlement to
maternal health care services that are medically appropriate and of good
quality. 271 Quality care requires "skilled medical personnel, scientifically
approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable
water, and adequate sanitation." 272
D. User Fees: A Violation of the Right to Health
User fees have not helped to attain the aforementioned components of
the right to health. In fact, user fees have clearly hindered the attainment
of the right to health in certain situations, particularly in terms of
accessibility. First, they have not increased availability of health services
for women. User fees were implemented in many countries with the
explicit aim of raising money for the health care sector and thereby
increasing the amount of health care services available to citizens. 273
Despite being instituted as a form of public-sector health care financing,
user fees have fallen far short of their goals of fundraising, bringing in an
average of 5 to 10% of funds for health care budgets.274 The imposition of
user fees has not substantially contributed to increasing availability via the
construction of new health care facilities or the training and hiring of
qualified medical professionals.275
Next, user fees have failed to make health care more accessible to
268. Press Release, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Cultural Sensitivity Key to
Development, New UNFPA Report Shows, U.N. Doc. POP/904 (May 18, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2004/pop9O4.doc.htm.
269. Id.
270. WHO, Making Pregnancy Safer, http://www.who.int/making-pregnancy-safer/
topics/maternal mortality/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) ("There are many
reasons why women do not receive the care they need before, during and after childbirth. In
some remote areas, there may be no availability of professional care. Or, if available, the care
may not be good.").
271. Paul Hunt & Judith Mesquita, Mental Disabilities and the Human Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 345 (2006).
272. General Comment 14, supra note 226, 12(d).
273. WITTER, supra note 37, at 1.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 174-183 and accompanying text.
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women. User fees have, in fact, interfered with the right to health by
making key interventions less accessible. Exemptions have not increased
access, as they are often unevenly or unfairly applied in developing
countries, thereby failing to reach the poorest members of the
population. 276 User fees have also not addressed cultural and physical
barriers to minority women's accessing health care. Those who are
disadvantaged and in remote regions have the most elastic demand for
health services and therefore decrease their use of health care more than
the wealthy when user fees are instituted.277 The U.N. CEDAW Committee
has expressed its concern over the intersection of user fees and decreased
access to care. For example, in the concluding observations regarding
China, the Committee expressed its concern regarding the rising costs of
health care and user fees which limited the access of rural women to health
services.278 Similar statements have been made, for example, in relation to
Tanzania, 279 Cape Verde, 280 Kenya, 281 and Slovakia. 282
Lastly, user fees have not significantly improved the quality of health
care available to women. 283 Where improvements have been made, in
some instances the central government has replaced its funding of public
health with the user fee revenue,284 resulting in no net improvement in
quality of care.
E. The Right to Life
User fees also raise questions implicating the right to life. Under the
ICCPR, "[e]very human being has the inherent right to life.... No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."'2 The right to life can be broadly
understood as a government's obligation to ensure that those within its
jurisdiction are secure from arbitrary and preventable loss of life. The HRC
has explicitly acknowledged that states are not free to restrictively interpret
the implementation of the right to life and must adopt positive measures to
276. See supra notes 153-171 and accompanying text.
277. WITER, supra note 37, at 1.
278. CEDAW Committee, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: China, 27, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6 (2006).
279. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: Tanzania, 46, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.156 (2001).
280. CEDAW Committee, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Cape Verde, 29, https://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
cedaw/cedaw-capeverde2006.html.
281. CESCR, Concluding Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Kenya, 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/KEN/CO/1 (2008).
282. CEDAW Committee, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Slovakia, 28, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/4 (2008).
283. WrTER, supra note 37, at 2.
284. ELDIS, Goal 4, supra note 180.
285. ICCPR, supra note 203, art. 6(l). This right is explicitly recognized in numerous other
international treaties. UDHR art. 3; European Convention on Human Rights art. 2; African
Charter art. 4; American Convention on Human Rights art. 4.
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protect the right.286 Furthermore, states must report on pregnancy and
childbirth-related maternal deaths.287  In other words, the right to life is
not solely implicated in the context of criminal law, but more broadly
includes the necessity of state action to protect the right to life in the
context of health care services.
F. User Fees: A Violation of the Right to Life
The imposition of user fees constitutes a violation of the right to life
when such fees create barriers to accessing life-saving treatment. For
example, fees for the use of emergency rooms or for surgical procedures
are common. When a woman cannot afford treatment for a life-threatening
medical issue, such as a post-partum hemorrhage, the loss of her life can be
attributed, at least in part, to the financial barriers to care. User fees, thus,
constitute a barrier to governments' guarantee of the right to life with
respect to their most poor and vulnerable citizens.
G. The Right to Non-Discrimination
Most governments have made an explicit commitment to protect core
human rights; they have pledged to do so in a non-discriminatory
fashion.288 CEDAW explicitly requires States parties to provide access to
health services in a non-discriminatory manner: "States Parties shall take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the
field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women, access to health care services." 289
The CESCR has similarly interpreted the right to the highest attainable
standard as prohibiting "any discrimination in access to health care and
underlying determinants of health, as well as to means and entitlements for
their procurement." 290 The Committee recommends the integration of a
"gender perspective" in the creation and promotion of health related
policies.291
The denial or neglect of health care interventions that only women
need is a form of discrimination against women. Health care interventions
necessary for maternal health, such as the provision of emergency obstetric
care, must be prioritized in order to "guarantee women's enjoyment of the
right to health on the basis of non-discrimination and equality." 292 It is
286. Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 6: The Right to Life, T 5 (1982);
HRC, General Comment 28, Equality of Rights between Men and Women, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C.21/Rev.l/Add.10 (2000).
287. Id.
288. CEDAW, supra note 205, art. 12.
289. Id. art. 12(1).
290. General Comment 14, supra note 226, T 18.
291. Id. 20.
292. Special Rapporteur, supra note 225, 28(b).
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important to keep in mind that, in non-discrimination analysis,
discriminatory effect is just as important as discriminatory intent. 293
H. User Fees: A Violation of the Right to Non-Discrimination
User fees for health services disproportionately affect women in
developing countries,294 and too often put basic reproductive health care
out of their reach. 295 Economically disadvantaged women often cannot
afford even nominal fees for health care services. The denial of services,
particularly at times of emergency, increases the likelihood of injury and
death to the woman and her newborn,296 in violation of the rights to life
and health. These fees compound the difficulties wrought by inequitable
social structures, which take the decision to seek care at all out of these
women's hands. 297
This social impact is particularly troubling because "dignity in health is
not only a question of being free from avoidable disease, but also a
function of the way in which individuals, communities, and whole societies
engage in the process of obtaining and maintaining a standard of
health." 298  User fees skew this process away from the recognition of
fundamental rights and obscure the state's and other parties' obligations to
provide for progressive realization of these rights.
When states or international lending institutions impose user fees on
maternal health services, they defy the right to non-discrimination. User
fees contravene CEDAW's commitment to providing health services in a
non-discriminatory manner because of the often inherently discriminatory
nature of their implementation. The imposition of user fees also constitutes
an infringement of the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO USER FEES
Policies aimed at respecting, protecting, and fulfilling women's right to
health should be guided by the fact that "as a first principle, programs and
policies need to prioritize measures that promote universal access to high
quality emergency obstetric care services." 299 Because user fees pose a
formidable obstacle to access for many women, states must assess and
293. See Alicia Ely Yamin & Deborah P. Maine, Maternal Mortality as a Human Rights Issue:
Measuring Compliance With International Treaty Obligations, 21 HuM. RTS. Q. 563, 603 (1999);
CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005).
294. See Ensor & Ronoh, supra note 162, at 51 (describing a preference for male household
members in receiving health care).
295. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 22, at 130-31 (reviewing literature on the relationship
between user fees and women's access to health care services).
296. Ensor & Ronoh, supra note 162, at 50.
297. Id. at 51.
298. Freedman, supra note 23, at 51.
299. Id.
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implement alternatives to these fees. States must use all available
resources and take all appropriate measures in order to work towards the
realization of the right to health.300
Eliminating user fees requires more than the removal of formal fees.
Substantial funding increases are necessary. Indirect costs, such as
transportation and food, serve as barriers to care and compound the effects
of formal fees. In addition, if formal user fees are used to finance facility
operations or reduce the demand for services at a facility, then dismantling
fees without making a commitment to having a compensating increase in
funding from tax revenue or another source may lead to health care
providers to charge additional fees in order to cover their expenses.
Governments must provide supplementary funding to replace the lost
revenue or they risk adversely affecting the supply of essentials like drugs
and medical supplies, and the corresponding quality of care.30 1
The following analysis will first address the issue of debt repayment, a
critical factor that constrains governments' effort to finance health care,
particularly in the developing world. Our analysis then focuses on three
health care financing policies that have received considerable attention in
the health care debate: taxation, debt relief, and insurance/mutual aid
schemes. We then apply a human rights framework to assess these
alternatives.
A. Debt Repayment
Health care financing alternatives must be considered within the
context of debt repayment to IFIs. In 2000, in Sierra Leone, the government
spent 280% more on debt service than it did on its health care budget.30 2
These statistics are not unusual. That same year, the Kenyan government
spent about 250% more on debt service that it did on its health care budget,
and the Ghanaian government spent over 400% more on debt service than
it did on its health care budget. 303 A study examining ten African countries
found that these countries were spending four times more on debt
servicing per year than on health and education.304 In Africa, the average
government expenditure on health is less than $50 per person.305 A survey
by UNICEF found that in thirty developing countries, governments
consistently under-invest in social services, in part because of the fiscal
300. Id. at 55.
301. See, e.g., Josephine Borghi et al., Mobilising Financial Resources for Maternal Health, 368
LANCET 1457, 1459 (2006).
302. See International Debt Observatory, Debt Service/Health Care Budget (DS/-IB),
http://www.oid-ido.org/en.ratio.php3?id-article=96 (using World Bank debt service figures
and WHO health care budget figures to analyze the ratio between debt service, "DS," and
health care budget, "HB"). "DS/HB measures the burden of the debt service in relation to the
country's expenditure in healthcare. It shows to what extent debt service can prevent health
expenditure." Id.
303. See id.
304. Ann Pettifor & Romilly Greenhill, Debt Relief and the Millennium Development Goals 18
(U.N. Development Programme, Occasional Paper, 2002).
305. BRAAM, supra note 80, at 9.
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burden imposed by servicing debt.30 6
WHO literature points to the same problem. For example, in 2001, a
WHO commission called for governments to increase health sector
spending as a long-term development strategy.30 7 However, it is difficult
for countries to meet these new health sector spending standards. Dr.
Sergio Spinaci, Executive Secretary of the Coordination of Macroeconomics
and Health Support Unit of WHO, stated, "It is not easy within present
budgetary constraints to invest more in health, especially if you have a
large proportion of the budget invested in debt repayments and a
macroeconomic policy focused on containing even minor inflation and
setting rigid spending ceilings for the social sectors."308 Making changes in
national health policy requires a major reallocation of resources, which can
be daunting for many governments.
While the World Bank and IMF's more recent debt relief programs for
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) have alleviated some of the harsh
effects of debt services on developing countries, they have not been a
comprehensive solution. First, not all countries have qualified for HIPC
debt relief. 30 9 Furthermore, at least one study has found that debt relief for
HIPC countries has, at the margin, little or no effect on health expenditures,
perhaps due to lingering debt overhang or different spending priorities of
HIPC countries. 310
Loan repayment compounds difficulties in financing health services
because repayment draws off a disproportionate percentage of public
money for interest payments. In addition, eligibility for loans is often
conditioned on the reduction of public services. 311  In effect, debt
repayment imposes a double burden, with particularly deleterious
consequences for the poorest members of the population.
B. Taxation
Financing tools can be separated into direct and indirect methods.
User fees constitute direct methods, and have resulted in the inequities and
deficiencies in health care service discussed previously. Instead of
charging directly at the point of service to the person receiving care, some
policy makers have suggested that countries use indirect methods of
306. HUTTON, supra note 19, § 5.1.
307. Clare Nullis Kapp, Macroeconomics and Health Commission Findings Become Reality, 82
BULL. WHO 957 (2004), available at http://www.scielosp.org/pdf/bwho/v82n12/v82n12a18.
pdf.
308. Id.
309. Railf Hepp, Health Expenditures Under the HIPC Debt Initiative 1 (U. Cal. Davis
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 12, 2005).
310. Id. at 17-18.
311. Jubilee USA Network, Background Briefing and Frequently Asked Questions: Debt
Cancellation and the Jubilee Act for Responsible Lending and Expanded Debt Cancellation (2004),
http://www.jubileeusa.org/ fileadmin/ user-upload/ Resources/JUBILEE-Act/ m408-hearin
g/042408JubileeUSABackgroundMemo.pdf (noting the IMF's HIPC debt forgiveness
condition that countries restrict public sector salaries for doctors and teachers). 44
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financing that "pool across time (prepayment) and across different risk and
wealth groups (insurance and general taxation)." 312
Funding through general taxation has inherent limits in poor countries,
but states do have the obligation to work towards universal access to
health services "by all appropriate means." 313 This includes addressing the
obstacles facing the most disadvantaged groups, such as the poor, residents
of rural areas, racial and ethnic minorities, and women.314
Taxation presents options for states to pool tax funds and redistribute
them to marginalized segments of the population. Marginalized women
may enjoy increased access to health care and coverage of medical
treatment, paid for by the taxes of wealthier citizens. Of course, the
taxation model moves away from the decentralized management goals that
accompanied the institution of user fees, and typically calls for more
central government control over collection and allocation of resources.
However, taxation, like other financing options that rely on more
centralized control, could positively interplay with national governments'
growing commitment to devote significant portions of the national budget
to health care. Indeed, in the Abuja Declaration of 2001, the heads of state
of the Organisation of African Unity committed to "take all necessary
measures to ensure that the needed resources [for the health care sector]
are made available from all sources and that they are efficiently and
effectively utilized .... We pledge to set a target of allocating at least 15%
of our annual budget to the improvement of the health sector." 31 5
The central governments' allocation of at least 15% of funds, if
combined with progressive taxation schemes, could provide a robust pool
of money to build health care infrastructure to target a range of national
health priorities, including maternal health care services. Ultimately, the
policy choice between centralized and decentralized control of funding and
distribution of health care services is one that must be made by the
governments and members of civil society in developing countries,
perhaps in consultation with development scholars.
C. Debt Forgiveness
While increased aid would make abolishing user fees more feasible, the
risks of adding to countries' already sizeable debt burdens are substantial if
aid is provided in the form of additional loans. Donor funding can prove
unreliable over time making it difficult to plan annual health budgets
around fluctuating streams of cash. 316
312. Ensor & Ronoh, supra note 162, at 49.
313. ICESCR, supra note 24, art. 2.
314. General Comment 14, supra note 226, 12(b).
315. Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases, para.
26, U.N. Doc. OAU/SPS/ABUJA/3 (Apr. 24-27, 2001), http://www.un.org/ga/aids/
pdf/abujadeclaration.pdf.
316. For example, the United States has been an unreliable source of funding for the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which in turn has affected UNFPA's ability to do
important reproductive health work in developing countries. See POPULATION ACTION
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An alternative has been proposed via debt-forgiveness programs, in
which donors agree to forgive portions of debt under certain conditions,
such as, for example, a governmental commitment to channel money that
would otherwise be dedicated to debt service to particular sectors. In 1996,
the World Bank and IMF launched a debt relief program under the HIPC
Initiative to assist the poorest countries with unsustainable debt burdens.317
Since 1996, more than 30 countries have received some debt relief under
the HIPC Initiative. These countries must submit to funding conditions;
savings must be channeled to social sectors such as health and education.318
Some commentators have criticized these conditions as being too inflexible
to allow countries to design and sequence innovative solutions to their
country-specific development challenges. 319 Nevertheless, country data
collected over the past 10 years have shown that many countries are
experiencing clear gains as a result of debt forgiveness, particularly in the
fields of health and education. The IMF reports:
Before the HIPC Initiative, eligible countries were, on average,
spending slightly more on debt service than on health and
education combined. Now, they have increased markedly their
expenditures on health, education and other social services and, on
average, such spending is now about six times the amount of debt-
service payments.320
The combination of the HIPC Initiative and the United States'
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) is expected to reduce the debt
stock of 31 HIPCs by $96 billion.321 Debt AIDS Trade Africa reports that for
every dollar freed from debt service payments, African governments have
been able to increase social spending by two dollars.322 Further, debt relief
has helped to "create a more attractive environment for private investment
and improve the long-term chances for sustainable development" and
poverty eradication. 323
The experience of Honduras under the HIPC Initiative demonstrates
the potential for channeling these funds into demonstrable improvements
in the quality and coverage of health care. Honduras began receiving
HIPC debt forgiveness in 2000, and it devised a poverty strategy reduction
program that aimed, in part, to address concerns about quality and
INTERNATIONAL, WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RESTORE FUNDING FOR UNFPA (2008),
http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Fact-Sheets/FS3/Summary.shtml.
317. IMF, DEBT RELIEF UNDER THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE
(2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
318. Id.
319. HIPC DEBT RELIEF: MYTHS AND REALITY 6-7 (Jan Joost Teunissen & Age Akkerman,
eds., 2004).
320. IMF, supra note 317.
321. Jubilee USA Network, supra note 311, at 2.
322. Id.
323. Id.
Answering the Millennium Call for Maternal Health
46
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol12/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
coverage in the health sector, particularly regarding women.324 The
government's strategy sought to decentralize health services and improve
the provision of basic health services.325
Honduras sought to institute reform of the social security system,
crucial to coverage and quality of health services. This included
strengthening the regulatory capacity of the Ministry of Health and
improving coverage, efficiency, and quality of health service provision.326
As of 2005, 121 health facilities had been rehabilitated and licensed under
the health ministry's new certification program that helps set health
standards.327
Honduras also aimed to strengthen basic health services for the poor.
In particular, it sought to deliver basic health care to at least 100,000
beneficiaries in poor communities, 328 with emphasis on primary and
maternal/child health. 329 During 2004, coverage of the basic package of
primary health care services was extended to cover more than 285,000
persons in poor communities. 330  Since the institution of the HIPC
Initiative, therefore, measurable improvements have been seen in the
health sector, particularly with respect to the poor and disadvantaged
citizens of Honduras.331
Other international lending institutions have experimented with debt
forgiveness as a type of targeted funding to particular sectors. In March
2007, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) agreed to cancel $4.4
billion in debt and interest owed by five of the poorest Latin American and
Caribbean countries: Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 332
Savings will be channeled to health care, education, and infrastructure
development. 333
Progress has been made in HIPC-qualifying countries. Yet there is much
more room for action. Of the world's sixty-six poorest countries, the
majority are beholden to debtors and in the midst of a "debt crisis." 334 A
January 2007 study evaluating forty-one countries that had not yet
completed the HIPC Initiative found "that a majority of these countries
were paying more now on debt service than they were in 1996."335
324. IMF, Decision Point Document for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative 8 (June 20, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/NP/hipc/2000/hnd.pdf
(last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
325. Id.
326. IMF, 2005 Article IV Consultation, Second Review Under the Three-Year
Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, 40, IMF Country Report No.




329. Id. at 43.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Press Release, Inter-American Development Bank, IDB Governors Approval $4.4
Billion in Debt Relief for Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua (March 16, 2007).
333. Id.
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The success of debt forgiveness programs will depend on governments
working with international lending institutions like the World Bank to
identify shortfalls in their health care systems, as well as specific strategies
for remedying these shortfalls. International donors like the World Bank
and IMF face increasing pressure to eliminate the restrictive conditions that
have made debt relief less effective. The Center for Global Development
and Jubilee USA Network criticized the IMF's stringent requirements
imposed on poor countries that include paying down the domestic debt
and restricting public sector salaries for doctors and teachers. 336
Debt forgiveness policies should be sensitive to emerging needs in the
wake of user fee elimination, particularly the needs of women and the
poor. Loan forgiveness programs should work towards implementing
long-term, sustainable systems of support for health care funding.
D. Health Insurance/Mutual Aid
Government funded, tax-based health insurance is a prevalent feature
in many countries' health care policies. In theory, a nationwide insurance
policy should allow the government to pool risk and transfer resources to
those most in need. In practice, however, a number of factors may frustrate
these objectives. Many studies of state spending that focus on maternal
health have found that the provision of government health services tends
to be "only weakly pro-poor." 337
The following sections articulate some of the common challenges
facing policy makers as they design and implement national health
insurance policies. The final section analyzes Ghana's recently-enacted
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) as an example of how even
well-intentioned health insurance schemes will be ineffective at meeting
the health needs of the poor unless they are designed through an anti-
poverty, "pro-poor" lens.
1. Remedying Regressive Funding of Health Services
Studies have shown that some governments allocate health care
funding regressively. 338 The reasons for this failure are illustrative. They
included the location of better-financed health facilities in urban, wealthier
areas, greater awareness of available services among more affluent
populations, and the exclusionary effects of informal costs. 339 Regressive
funding exacerbates inequalities between rural, typically poor, residents
and their urban, wealthier counterparts. In order to meet the greater health
needs of the entire population, governments must focus resources on
336. Id. at 3.
337. See infra, note 352 (providing an example of the "only weakly pro-poor" nature of
Ghana's recently enacted National Health Insurance Scheme).
338. Ensor & Ronoh, supra note 162, at 52.
339. Id.
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poorer areas to ensure that all members of society attain the right to health.
2. Addressing Socioeconomic Inequities
Insurance programs rely on voluntary, flat-rate premiums from
community members, which help to finance local care facilities that
provide free or discounted care. However, they also produce marked
inequalities in many communities. For example, community insurance
members in the Democratic Republic of Congo were seven times more
likely to receive assisted delivery care than non-members. 340 Screening
patients and exempting poor people from paying premiums produce many
of the same difficulties as user fees.
A possible solution to minimize premiums is to differentiate between
services deemed necessary and those deemed not necessary. For example,
one community insurance scheme in the Kasongo District of the
Democratic Republic of Congo separated medical services into "needs" and
"demands." 341  In this scheme, while a caesarean section might be
considered necessary, the request for a private hospital room might be
treated as a demand. 342
3. Remedying Coverage Gaps
Community health insurance schemes often fail to provide women
with access to adequate reproductive care. In Kenya, insurance schemes
excluded normal delivery altogether, restricting coverage to complicated
deliveries and other treatments for conditions that were not "pre-existing
or self-determined." 343 In Gujarat, India, a community-based scheme
excluded the costs of normal delivery care, although it included costs of
pregnancy complications if they resulted in a hospital stay of more than 24
hours.344 Coverage exclusions were justified on the grounds that the
burden of higher risk patients demanding complicated deliveries would
make the health care scheme financially unsustainable. 345 These coverage
gaps are troubling if community health insurance is expected to replace
user fees in poor areas.
4. Meeting the Needs of Community Members Who Are Unable to
Pay the Premiums
Perhaps an even more difficult obstacle facing community health
340. See, e.g., Josephine Borghi et al., Mobilising Financial Resources for Maternal Health, 368
LANCET 1460 (2006).
341. Bart Criel, District-Based Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, STUD. IN HEALTH
SERVICES ORG. & POL'Y (1998), at 16-17.
342. Id. at 7.
343. Ensor & Ronoh, supra note 162, at 53.
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insurance programs is community members' ability to pay for health
insurance. Community insurance programs may prove to be unsustainable
in the face of economic downturns, poor agricultural yields, or other
contingencies. "Acknowledging that the financial objectives may not, and
probably should not, be full cost recovery, many [community-based health
insurance programs] will appropriately aim initially to match the revenues
from user-fees rather than substitute for government funds to the district
health services."346
Unlike user fees, community health insurance has been shown at least
in some cases to increase demand for maternal health care and thus
improve access.347 Notwithstanding these advantages and the potential of
at least a supplemental role for community health insurance, an inherent
problem with these programs is the fact that the poorest clients, regardless
of how the market is structured, lack disposable income to dedicate to
premiums. Moreover, the redistributive capacity of moving resources from
the poor to the poorest has obvious limitations.
5. Case Study: Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme
Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) provides an
example of how even well-intentioned health insurance schemes are often
only weakly pro-poor.
The Ghanaian Parliament approved the Health Insurance Act 650 in
2003, and two years later the NHIS was launched.348 The goal of the
initiative was to replace user fees, which the government realized had
limited poor persons' access to health care, and "improve access to health
care for the poor and improve financial sustainability of the health
system."349 The NHIS collects a large portion of its the revenue through a
2.5% consumption tax, as well as mandatory payroll deductions and a
graduated premium payment scheme.350 As of January 2007, more than
seven million people had enrolled in the program, constituting more than
35% of the population but still below the program's goal of complete
national coverage.351
A range of key policy issues have emerged in the first years of the
NHIS implementation. First, under the scheme, certain categories of
individuals who are unable to pay the minimum premium are intended to
be registered for the scheme, but made "exempt" from paying the
premium payment. In particular, "indigents," elderly persons over
346. Dyna C. Arhin-Tenkorang, District Based Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4
TROPICAL MED. & INT'L HEALTH 629, 629 (1999) (book review).
347. Ensor & Ronoh, supra note 162, at 52.
348. WORLD BANK, PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT, HEALTH INSURANCE PROJECT:
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE COUNCIL, REPUBLIC OF GHANA, World Bank Report No.
AB3035 (April 9, 2007).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. WOTRO, supra note 25.
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seventy, and children under eighteen whose parents are registered are
intended to belong to an "exempt" group.35 2
However, the NHIS has identified a threshold of 0.5% participation by
indigents, a percentage far below the country's rate of poverty, after which
point a review is triggered. 3 3 "Indigents" are defined restrictively under
the scheme's implementing regulations, so that poor persons living in
compound facilities with family members, a frequent form of social
support, are often unable to qualify if they have any visible source of
income or live with a person providing "identifiable consistent support." 354
Further, district scheme managers are encouraged to stay within the 0.5%
indigent target because when they exceed it, they trigger a review of their
registration "by whatever means the [National Health Insurance] Council
determines." 355 Unregistered persons, in turn, may confront increased
costs of treatment as the pool of persons seeking health care becomes
fragmented and costs spiral for those making out-of-pocket payments.356
The World Bank has noted the difficulties in providing effective
coverage under the scheme for the poor and "exempt" indigents:
Although the purpose of the NHIS is to provide a pro-poor
alternative to the Cash and Carry system, there are still problems
with identifying and registering indigents who are "exempt" from
coverage; registering poor informal sector workers who may still
find the income-based premium levels too high; [and] finding a
financially sustainable solution for subsidizing the "exempt"
groups ... 357
The World Bank has responded by supporting policy developments
that aim to improve the governance of the NHIS implementation, including
"maintaining a pro-poor focus." 358 It has noted that in order for Ghana and
other developing countries to realize the goals set out by the United
Nations MDGs, including dramatically reducing maternal mortality, they
must increase spending on health care.359 To meet the goal of reducing
maternal mortality, health care spending must target certain critical
programs, including the provision of antenatal and emergency obstetric
care. Health insurance schemes like NHIS will have to be designed to
effectively spread risk and target the poor through selective premium
352. Ghana National Health Insurance Regulations (2004) (LI 1809), at Regulation 56
(discussing exemption for dependents and elderly); Ghana National Health Insurance Act 650
(2003), at Section 77(2)(c) (explaining that the health insurance fund should "set aside some
monies from the Fund to provide for the Health care cost of indigents").
353. Ghana National Health Insurance Regulations (2004) LI 1809), at Regulation 58(5).
354. Ghana National Health Insurance Regulations (2004) (LI 1809), at Regulation 58(1).
355. Ghana National Health Insurance Regulations (2004) (LI 1809), at Regulation 58(5).
356. Diane McIntyre et al., Beyond Fragmentation and Towards Universal Coverage: Insights
from Ghana, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania, 86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 817
(2008), available at http:/ / www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/11/08-053413/en/index.html.
357. World Bank, supra note 346, at 3.
358. Id. at 5.
359. Id. at 3-4.
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subsidies.
VII. DESIGNING EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE FINANCING
Overall, the trend appears to be moving away from user fees, with a
large number of international lenders and intergovernmental alliances
advocating free health services. Yet, international criticism may not be
sufficient to eliminate the harmful effects of user fees. User fees are often
still imposed because of the belief that they can improve health sector
financing and quality, or are still in place because of bureaucratic inertia.360
The challenge of loan repayments, coupled with countries' desires to
expand and improve health services, contribute to the maintenance of user
fees. Misplaced spending priorities and a small tax base exacerbate the
financial pressures that help to justify user fees. This is true despite user
fees' proven ineffectiveness at raising substantial revenue.361
Yet, when the international development policy debate is viewed
through the lens of human rights, it becomes clear that the policy of
imposing user fees for access to basic reproductive health care cannot be
reconciled with states' obligations under international human rights law.
In the long term, fees channel limited resources away from the individuals
who most critically need health services. The poor, vulnerable and
marginalized members of the population are excluded from the health
system. In the specific context of maternal health, researchers in Benin and
Ghana looking at 'near-miss' obstetric events noted that the total cost of
delivery, including drugs and medical supplies, creates a large financial
burden for households and contributes to high rates of maternal
mortality. 362 This has been confirmed by the work of international NGOs
such as Save the Children, which has calculated that the elimination of user
fees would save the lives of 285,000 children each year.363
User fees present impediments to accessible and affordable health care,
and they thereby contribute to the startling maternal mortality statistics
confronting the developing world today. Their continued use is
incompatible with minimum obligations under international human rights
law.
A. Lessons for the World Bank and Large International Lenders
The World Bank, as one of the major international lenders to
developing countries, plays a significant role in the continued existence of
user fees. The World Bank views itself as having a comparative advantage
360. WrITER, supra note 37, at 25.
361. Id.
362. Josephine Borghi et al., Costs of Near-Miss Obstetric Complications for Women and Their
Families in Benin and Ghana, 18 HEALTH POL'Y PLAN 383, 386-87 (2003).
363. SAVE THE CHILDREN, STILL PAYING WITH THEIR LIvEs: THE COST OF ILL FOR CHILDREN
IN AFRICA 1 (2006). 52
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol12/iss1/2
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
in the following area: "health financing, insurance, demand-side
interventions, regulation, and systemic arrangements for fiduciary and
financial management." 364 The World Bank has said it intends to further
develop its advantages as it works with other agencies, like WHO, that
have an advantage in designing technical programs such as disease
control.365
The World Bank's "no blanket rule" discouraging user fees will likely
have a substantial impact on the health care financing policies of
developing nations in the coming decades. But the Bank should do more.
In accordance with a human rights framework, the World Bank and other
key international actors should rethink, rescind and remove user fees.
B. Lessons for Wealthy States
Wealthy states continue to play a key role in setting health care
financing schemes in developing countries, through their role in World
Bank and international lender decisions, through their individual donor
efforts, and through debt forgiveness. The implementation of user fees
represents a failure of the obligations demanded by the right to health and
by Article 2 of the ICESCR for rich states to assist poor states in achieving
economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to health. This
obligation consists of two elements. First, rich states should not impede the
provision of necessary health care services.366 Second, rich countries should
assist poor countries in progressively realizing the right to health.367 This
second element extends to the encouragement and subsidization of the
delivery of critical health services, such as maternal health care.
CONCLUSION
The majority of maternal deaths are preventable, even in countries
with limited resources. 368 User fees continue to serve as a barrier to the
services necessary for improving maternal health. Over the past twenty
years user fees have failed to accomplish their stated goals, including
improvement of efficiency and equity through increase in healthcare
revenue and an increase in quality and coverage of medical care. 369 To the
contrary, the implementation of user fees has worsened the situation of
access to healthcare by creating barriers to care for those citizens who are
most in need of care, particularly women and the poor. In light of these
364. World Bank, supra note 92, at 18.
365. Id.
366. ICESCR, supra note 24, art. 2.
367. See id.
368. See WHO, supra note 4. Maternal death is defined as "Itlhe death of a woman while
pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site
of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its
management but not from accidental or incidental causes." MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2005,
supra note 1, at 4.
369. WITTER, supra note 37, at 5-6.
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failures, this Article argues that if countries do not abolish user fees, they
will not respect, protect, and fulfill expectant women's rights to health, life,
and non-discrimination.
The following recommendations pertaining to health sector reform and
user fees should be considered by countries to better enable the realization
of human rights with particular regard to pregnant women.
A. Abolish User Fees for Basic Care, Including Emergency Obstetric
Care
As argued in this Article, user fees are "perhaps the most regressive
form of health care financing."370 Overwhelming evidence demonstrates
that user fees hurt the poor, impose a barrier to access, reinforce
inequitable social structures, and lower transparency in allowing
governments to shirk their responsibility to respect, protect, and fulfill the
human rights of all their citizens. They fail to yield any appreciable
efficiency, revenue generation, or accountability gains. Countries must
recognize that exemption and waiver schemes have failed to adequately
protect the poor and must abolish user fees for health, including
emergency obstetric care.
B. Increase Funding
In phasing out user fees, governments and donors must provide
adequate resources to meet the increased demand and to offset the limited
revenue that user fees generate for local facilities. Without an
accompanying increase in funding, the elimination of user fees threatens
quality of care and may actually lower access. External donor funding
should support increases in a consistent and reliable manner, with the goal
of making health care programs in developing countries self-sustaining in
the long term.
C. Decentralize Funding
Decentralization has the benefits that were originally identified, yet not
attained, in the Bamako Initiative. There is the potential for decision-
making on a local level that is sensitive to the needs of the community.
Community-based co-management of health services can target care to a
particular community's needs and establish a clearer system of
accountability for providing accessible and quality care. For example, in
the event of a health sector shortfall, it is oftentimes easier to identify a
local health center's weaknesses in management or its need for additional
370. Lucy Gilson & Di McIntyre, Removing User Fees for Primary Care in Africa: the Need for
Careful Action, 331 BRIT MED. J. 762 (2005).
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financial assistance to address a community's unique need for gender-
sensitive than it is to identify systemic breakdowns and failures in the
health sector. Nationwide funding schemes such as taxation and general
insurance, which pool resources, would have to reallocate them to local
control in order to achieve such decentralization.
Evidence suggests that decentralization is an effective model. For
example, decentralization partially explains the successful elimination of
user fees in Uganda.371  There, management committees had been
established to co-administer user fee revenues from local health facilities.372
In eliminating user fees, the government of Uganda not only increased
overall health funding but also retained the decentralized user fee
administrative structure, allocating a portion of the (tax-generated) budget
to the management committees for them to use according to their
preferences.373
Economic feasibility and political acceptability have constrained the
development and effectiveness of decentralized schemes. Yet, it may be
possible to realize effective decentralized schemes by combining economic
reforms with increased foreign aid commitments. Donors have already
made commitments to issue aid more reliably, 374 and development policies
are increasingly helping governments raise revenue by establishing an
effective tax base and a progressive taxation scheme. The IMF and World
Bank can offer technical assistance to help countries design solid economic
foundations that can sustain functioning health care systems.
D. Raise Awareness While Increasing Monitoring and
Accountability
Increased monitoring and accountability mechanisms can also help
ensure that public spending makes its way to the poor. On a country-wide
basis, monitoring systems should be established to document the provision
of geographically accessible emergency obstetric care. One commentator
advocates a minimum of four basic care facilities - giving women access
to essential drugs like antibiotics and oxytocics and assistance for
uncomplicated deliveries - and one comprehensive care facility that offers
blood transfusions and cesarean sections per 500,000 inhabitants.375
371. See HUTTON, supra note 19, § 5.2.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoe
cd/11/41/34428351.pdf (representing an international agreement to which more than 100
ministers, heads of agencies, and other senior officials adhered, committing their countries
and organizations to continue increasing efforts in harmonization, alignment, and managing
aid through a monitoring system).
375. Angela Sawyerr-Kamara, Maternal Mortality: A Public Health Perspective, in LEARNING
TO DANCE 131 (Alicia Ely Yamin ed., 2005).
[Vol. 12
55
Hall et al.: Answering the Millennium Call for the Right to Maternal Health: The Need to Eliminate User Fees
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
2009]
To ensure that women have access to appropriate treatment once they
reach individual facilities, public health care workers, and governments
should gather critical information on factors such as the distribution of
emergency obstetric care facilities, the number of complicated procedures
performed, fatality statistics, the availability of essential drugs, and the
community's view of the facility. 376 To address sites with existing user
fees, public officials should determine which facilities charge fees and
identify priorities for increased funding to these facilities.
Awareness campaigns can also help to ensure that end-users know
what health services they are entitled to, and what fees they can expect.
Members of civil society and health care workers should play a role in
these conversations. Patients must understand their rights under the law
to be able to demand them. If user fees are abolished without an adequate
public information campaign, health workers may continue to charge
informal costs. Policy makers should also increase their own awareness of
implementation challenges by consulting with the staff at local facilities
and gathering ideas on how to move forward.
E. Focus on the Poor
Perhaps most importantly, states must work to address the often
widespread inequalities in health care provision. They must ensure that all
citizens, irrespective of their economic status, receive adequate health care
services. Targeting health spending towards the poor offers a means for
states to fulfill their treaty obligations as well. The pitfalls of targeting the
poor through exemptions are well-documented. Nevertheless, as part of a
strategy for phasing out user fees, public funding may be creatively
targeted to address the cases of those most in need and thus complement
an otherwise comprehensive community health insurance program.
Vouchers 377 or refunds378 for medical services are two such innovative
methods that have been piloted to attempt to increase poor women's access
to maternal health care.379 Vouchers have the disadvantage of being
376. Id. at 135.
377. Vouchers are coupons that entitle the bearer to a predefined package of "best
practice" health services free of charge. See, e.g., Peter Sandiford et al., Vouchers for Health:
Using Voucher Schemes for Output-based Aid, PUB. POL'Y FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR (April 2002),
available at http://www.gpoba.org/docs/OBAHealthNicaragua.pdf (describing a voucher
system in Nicaragua that has created incentives for health care providers to lower prices or
raise quality).
378. Under a refund scheme, patients pay for their health care services and later receive a
refund for the costs that they bear. See, e.g., BRAC, http://www.brac.net/usa/bw-health.php
(describing a TB treatment regime where a fixed dose of treatments are given and the
recipient often pays deposit money for the treatment in advance and has this deposit money
refunded upon the completion of the treatment regime).
379. See, e.g., Josephine Borghi et al., supra note 301, at 1462 (noting that although the
World Bank has piloted the use of vouchers in several Asian countries, the results of the
evaluation of the scheme are not yet available).
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susceptible to diversion from their intended use into the black market.380
Refunds, on the other hand, may not provide relief to those most in need,
i.e. those who lack cash in advance for services. Again, exemptions and
targeting programs run the risk of becoming so complex that potential
beneficiaries cannot easily understand the services to which they are
entitled. Complexity also reduces transparency and results in more
barriers to access.
Geographic price discrimination, such as reducing or eliminating user
fees in rural areas, presents a targeting strategy for minimizing this
complexity. Peru's national insurance scheme, cited above to illustrate the
deficiencies of user fee exemptions, takes this approach. 381 In Peru, the law
provides that in districts where greater than 65% of the population lives in
poverty, residents qualify for universal free coverage under the national
insurance plan.382 Despite the problems in implementing this scheme, it
avoids much of the difficulty of exemptions based on individual
assessments of ability to pay and presents fewer transparency problems.
Another targeting strategy for avoiding this assessment is to exempt
certain treatments, such as obstetric care. In Bolivia, a subprogram of the
social insurance system specifically targeted maternal and child health
services by making key services free of charge. 383 The program led to a
50% increase in the use of public facilities for antenatal and delivery care,
primarily by the poor.384 Lack of funding resulted in a curtailment of the
Bolivian plan, however. 385 In addition to adequate financing, monitoring
and accountability measures (such as reviewing the indicators discussed
above) play an important role in assuring that targeting strategies achieve
their desired objectives.
By adhering to this Article's concluding lessons - specifically abolish
user fees, decentralize and increase funding, place a greater focus on the
poor, and increase participation and accountability - developing countries
can move closer to fulfilling their international and domestic obligations to
reduce maternal mortality. Further, as large international lenders and
donors continue to play a formative role in designing health care financing
schemes, they too should consider their policy choices from within a
human rights framework. It is important to keep in mind the U.N. MDG
regarding reducing maternal mortality by 75% by the year 2015. Yet, in
reaching for this aggregate reduction in maternal mortality, the
international community must remain cognizant of the inherently human,
individual nature of this work. A central question is: how does this health
care financing scheme advance and secure the right to health for each
woman, including those most marginalized by race, ethnicity, geography,
380. Id. at 1463.
381. Sharma et al., supra note 149, at 10, 21.
382. YAMIN, supra note 120, at 32.
383. TANIA DMY-RACZENKO ET AL., EVALUACION DEL SEGURO NACIONAL DE MATERNIDAD
Y NINEZ EN BOLIVIA [EVALUATION OF NATIONAL MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE IN
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poverty, or other factors? Without a concerted effort to advance the right
to health for these marginalized women by allowing their voices and
concerns to resonate in the policy debate, many will continue to die
preventable deaths.
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